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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Shortly after 2:30 a.m. local time on August 21, 2013, residents of the suburbs 
east of Damascus, Syria were woken by a series of rocket attacks. The suburbs, which 
were controlled by rebel forces opposing the Syrian government, were familiar with such 
attacks; in the week prior they had been subjected to heavy artillery barrages and attacks 
from aircraft as government forces attempted to oust rebels from the area.1 But, as the 
following hours would reveal, these rocket attacks were different. Upon impact, the 
warheads on the artillery rockets released clouds of sarin gas, a colorless, tasteless, and 
odorless nerve agent that attacks the nervous system.2 Sarin’s most distinguishing 
characteristic, however, is its lethality. Exposure to as little as 0.01 milligrams per 
kilogram of body weight can result in death within 15 minutes.3 In the hours after the 
attack, videos uploaded on social media depicted graphic footage of adults and children 
suffering from sarin exposure and bodies of the deceased laid out in hospitals, mosques, 
and on the street.4 Over 1,400 people, including over 400 children, were killed in the 
attack.5 
The attack shocked the international community. Although chemical weapons had 
been used in Syria on several other occasions during its civil war, the August 2013 attack 																																																								
1 Joby Warrick, “More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says,” The Washington 
Post, August, 30, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-
syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-
d27422650fd5_story.html?utm_term=.94d684a38a4d. 
2 “Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know,” BBC News, September 24, 2013, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399.  
3 “Sarin,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed on April 29, 2019, 
https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/5170. 
4 “Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know,” BBC News. 
5 United States Government, “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical 
Weapons on August 21, 2013,” Office of the Press Secretary, August 30, 2013, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-
government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21. 
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was notable for its huge number of civilian causalities and for the well-documented 
suffering of the victims.6 This attack and the broader pattern of chemical warfare in Syria 
has led to questions about the strength of the international norm against chemical 
weapons and whether its erosion will lead to increasing incidents of chemical warfare.7 
The continuing attacks have also raised questions about the effectiveness of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty that bans the research, 
production, and use of chemical weapons, because Syria has been a state party to the 
Convention since 2013.8 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what factors influence a country’s 
decision to comply or not comply with the CWC. The thesis draws on qualitative 
historical evidence from secondary sources, primary government documents when 
available, and contemporary policy and news reports to examine the issues of compliance 
and noncompliance with the CWC from two vantage points: chemical weapons programs 
and national implementation and enforcement. Using case studies of specific countries, 
this thesis looks to assess different hypotheses for state behavior regarding the CWC. The 
goal is to identify common threads within the analysis to better predict what 
circumstances influence compliance and noncompliance.  
 
Significance of the Research Question 
 
 As the use of chemical warfare in the Syrian civil war indicates, the elimination of 
chemical weapons is by no means a completed task. Even with widespread accession to 																																																								
6 Warrick, “More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says.” 
7 Lori Esposito Murray, “Can Syria’s Chemical Weapons be Stopped?” Council on Foreign Relations, 
April 16, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/interview/can-syrias-chemical-weapons-be-stopped.  
8 Ibid.  
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the CWC, chemical agents have been used in attacks in Syria, England, and Malaysia in 
the past three years.9 Therefore, understanding the factors that influence decisions to 
comply or not comply with the CWC is essential for moving forward with future 
disarmament efforts. A better grasp on how circumstances impact state decisions 
regarding chemical weapons can lead to more informed policymaking and outreach to 
provide support and assistance to countries in danger of proliferation.  
 
Classifications and Definitions 
 
 The concepts of compliance and noncompliance are central to the analyses within 
this thesis. While these terms will be defined more specifically in relation to the chapter 
topics later on, compliance is broadly defined as acting in a way that is consistent with 
the terms outlined in an agreement. Noncompliance is the failure to abide by the terms of 
an agreement.10 The other central term within this thesis is chemical weapons, which are 
defined in the CWC as any munitions or device designed to cause death, harm, or 
incapacitation to humans or animals through the action of chemicals.11 Throughout the 
project, the term non-chemical state will be used to describe countries that have no 
current or historical chemical weapons capabilities. The term chemical state will be used 
for countries that have either a current or a historical chemical weapons program. 
 
																																																								
9 Anthony Deutsch, “Chemical Weapons Team to Begin Assigning Blame for Syrian Attacks,” Reuters, 
November 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chemicalweapons-blame/chemical-weapons-team-
to-begin-assigning-blame-for-syrian-attacks-idUSKCN1NI1ZN. 
10 Jana von Stein, “Compliance with International Law,” Oxford Research Encyclopedias, November 2017, 
doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.81.  
11 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, September 3, 1992. 
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Case Selection 
  
 In Chapter III, I use the cases of Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Argentina, Cameroon, 
Germany, Libya, the United States, Russia, and Syria to analyze the factors that influence 
a state’s decision to commit to the CWC and to subsequently comply with the aspects of 
the Convention relating to the research, production, and use of chemical weapons. 
Further detail on the case selection is given in the introduction to Chapter III.  
 Chapter IV explores the cases of Bolivia, Armenia, and Lebanon to assess why 
states have not yet implemented national legislation as required by Article VII of the 
CWC. Further detail on the case selection is given in the introduction to Chapter IV. In 
addition to these case studies on implementation, two examples of enforcement, the cases 
of QC Chen and Hans Raj Shiv, are also examined.  
 
Evidence and Data 
  
 This thesis uses both primary and secondary sources in its analysis. The majority 
of the information in Chapter II as well as some of the background information for the 
case studies in Chapters III and IV comes from secondary sources including articles in 
academic journals, books on the history of chemical warfare, and studies from 
nongovernment and government sources. The case studies also draw heavily from 
primary sources including contemporaneous news reports, international agreements, 
laws, and government reports.  
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Chapter Overview 
 
 This thesis will begin with an overview of the history of chemical weapons 
including their development and use, the evolution of international views on their 
development and use, and the succession of international agreements to restrict their 
production and deployment. It will next consider the issue of compliance and 
noncompliance with the research, production, and use of chemical weapons through the 
nine cases in Chapter III. Five hypotheses, outlined at the beginning of that chapter, are 
used to assess each case. The thesis will then consider the issue of compliance and 
noncompliance with national implementation of the CWC. Three cases will be analyzed 
for the factors that impede a state’s ability to implement national legislation as required 
by the Convention. Two more cases will look at national enforcement of established 
legislation. The project will conclude with a presentation of the findings and a discussion 
of the implications of those findings.  
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CHAPTER II – BACKGROUND AND HISTORY  
 
 
THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL AGE 
 
Chemicals have played a role in warfare for over 4,000 years. While naturally 
occurring toxic substances have been used for hunting and targeted killings since 
prehistoric times, the first records of chemical weapons attacks on the battlefield date to 
around 2000 BCE with the use of toxic smoke in India and China.12 Militaries in India 
were able to use smoke screens and vapors that induced sleep during large-scale battles.13 
By 1000 BCE, the Chinese had multiple recipes for creating poisonous fumes and had 
designed smoke bombs that gave off a rudimentary sternutator in order to incapacitate 
their adversaries.14 Pulmonary irritants were also used in early Western warfare. 
Thucydides, an Athenian historian and general, documented the use of poisonous gas 
against the Athenians in 428 BCE in the Peloponnesian War. While Sparta was besieging 
the city of Plataea, its soldiers burned wood covered with pitch and sulfur beneath the 
city walls. The resulting smoke acted as a primitive choking agent on the city’s 
inhabitants.15 By 80 BCE, the Romans had developed a vapor that induced respiratory 
distress and blindness. The Roman Empire was able to so effectively incorporate 
chemical warfare into its battle tactics that, using the toxic vapor they had developed, 
																																																								
12 “Poisons, Plants and Paleolithic Hunters,” University of Cambridge, March 21, 2015, 
https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/features/poisons-plants-and-palaeolithic-hunters; David J. Baker, Toxic 
Trauma: A Basic Clinical Guide (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 11. 
13 Corey J. Hilmas et al., Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents (Elsevier Inc., 2009), 10. 
14 Ibid. 153-175. 
15 Baker, Toxic Trauma, 12. 
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their military was able to overwhelm and defeat the Charakitanes after only two days of 
fighting.16 
Most contemporaneous criticisms of early chemical weapons focused on the use 
of poisoned weapons. The Hindu Laws of Manu, which date to around 200 BCE, rejected 
the use of “weapons that are concealed, barbed, or smeared with poison or whose points 
blaze with fire.”17 Similarly, Greek and Roman writers declared the use of poisoned 
weapons as “abominable” and “a violation of nature.”18 These sentiments, which can be 
seen across cultures, were closely tied to the view that poison was a dishonorable and 
cowardly weapon.19 Although the use of toxic smoke is not explicitly mentioned in these 
criticisms, it is likely that it would have been seen in a comparable manner since using 
vapor to kill or incapacitate the enemy would be considered trickery rather than an honest 
victory won by skill and strength. The numerous documented cases of chemical weapons 
use during this period indicate that such criticisms were not significant deterrents to 
chemical weapons use.  
The deployment of toxic fumes in war continued into the Middle Ages. By the 
15th century, projectiles containing poisonous vapors were being employed against ships 
and during sieges.20 The Bishop of Münster, Christopher Bernhard von Galen, used 
explosives containing the poisonous plant belladonna to generate noxious vapors while 
besieging the city of Groningen during the Dutch War in 1672.21 Concerns about the use 
of poisonous weapons during the war resulted in the August 27, 1675 Strasbourg 																																																								
16 Hilmas, Handbook of Toxicology, 11. 
17 Leonard A. Cole, “The Poison Weapons Taboo: Biology, Culture, and Policy.” Politics and the Life 
Sciences 17, no. 2 (1998): 120. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Clare Henley, “The Political and Emotional Power of Chemical Weapons,”  
Oxford Research Group, January 18, 2017, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-political-and-
emotional-power-of-chemical-weapons. 
20 Hilmas et al., Handbook of Toxicology, 11. 
21 Baker, Toxic Trauma, 13. 
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Agreement. The agreement, made between France and the Holy Roman Empire, 
prohibited the use of poisoned bullets.22  
While the Strasbourg Agreement stands as the earliest known legal constraint on 
the use of chemical substances during war, it was limited in its purview; it was a bilateral 
constraint specific to the two signing states and only valid for the duration of the Dutch 
War.23 While the agreement came in response to specific incidents regarding the use of 
poisoned weapons during the Dutch War, it can also be seen as a part of the broader 
climate of Europe at the time. Poisonous weapons continued to be used throughout the 
Middle Ages but increasingly prominent figures including William of Malmesbury, 
Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius, Emerich de Vattel, Robert Ward, and Francis Lieber 
declared their use as against the laws of war and nature.24 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 
 
Advances in science and technology in the 18th and 19th centuries changed the 
landscape of chemical warfare. Early uses of chemical weapons relied on naturally 
occurring poisons such as sulfur and belladonna; however, by the turn of the 18th century, 
scientific progress had advanced enough to allow the synthesis of manmade toxic 
substances. Carl Wilhelm Scheele discovered chlorine gas in 1774 and isolated hydrogen 
cyanide in 1782.25 John Davy discovered phosgene gas in 1812.26 The synthesis of sulfur 
																																																								
22 Jean Pascal Zanders, “International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare: an Ambiguous 
Legacy,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law 8, no. 2 (2003): 394. 
23 Zanders, “International Norms,” 394. 
24 Cole, “The Poison Weapons Taboo: Biology, Culture, and Policy,” 120-121. 
25 Simon Cotton, “What is Chlorine Gas and How Did It Become a Weapon?” Newsweek, September 8, 
2016, https://www.newsweek.com/syrias-use-chlorine-gas-and-weapons-history-496568.; The Editors of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Hydrogen Cyanide,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, October 12, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/science/hydrogen-cyanide. 
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mustard, more commonly known as mustard gas, was documented several times in the 
early 1800s. By 1860, the British scientist Frederick Guthrie and the German chemist 
Albert Niemann had both independently documented the compound’s irritating 
properties.27 
 When combined with advancements in manufacturing and technology from the 
Industrial Revolution, these discoveries opened new possibilities for chemical warfare. 
Chemical weapons would no longer be constrained to only naturally available poisons, 
many of which were not well-suited for use on the battlefield; it would now be possible to 
create substances that were tailored to mass killing or incapacitation in war settings. 
Additionally, these substances could be produced and stored more efficiently and on a 
larger scale than was ever possible before the Industrial Revolution. Because of the 
scientific expertise and industrial infrastructure required to produce the new chemicals, 
the possibility of widespread chemical warfare remained restricted to states with the 
resources to support such advanced science and technology.28 
The discovery of these manmade poisons led to a renewed interest in the use of 
chemicals on the battlefield. In 1855, Admiral Lord Dundonald, an officer in the British 
Navy, suggested using sulfur dioxide filled artillery shells against the Russians during the 
Crimean War.29 Around the same time, a British chemist named Lyon Playfair also 
submitted a proposal to use chemicals as weapons against the Russian Navy. His plan 
made use of shells filled with cacodyl cyanide, which would release arsenic gas when 
																																																																																																																																																																					
26 Matthew Gunther, “Phosgene,” ChemistryWorld, June 3, 2015, 
https://www.chemistryworld.com/podcasts/phosgene/8617.article.  
27 Dirk Steinritz and Horst Thiermann, “Sulfur Mustard,” SpringerLink, June 25, 2017, 
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-17900-1_149.  
28 “Chemical Weapons.” Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics. 2005, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/chemical-weapons.  
29 Seymour M. Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare (United States of America: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1968), 4. 
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ruptured.30 The use of chemical weapons was proposed on both sides of the United States 
Civil War but never acted upon. A New York schoolteacher named John W. Doughty 
wrote multiple times to encourage United States officials to use chlorine gas shells 
against the Confederate Army. Joseph Jones, a Confederate Army surgeon, advocated on 
at least two occasions for the use of hydrogen cyanide against Union ships.31  
Although none of these proposals resulted in the use of chemical weapons, they 
illustrated a shift in the attitudes towards the military viability of chemical agents. Earlier 
uses of toxic substances on the battlefield were primarily aimed at distracting or irritating 
the enemy in the short term, but advances in chemistry meant that by the end of the 19th 
century, there existed chemicals such as mustard gas, chlorine gas, and hydrogen cyanide 
which could cause lasting physical injuries and death to anyone exposed to them.  
The advent of this new stage in chemical warfare was not universally embraced. 
For example, the Lieber Code, a set of instructions written in 1863 to outline acceptable 
wartime conduct for the United States Military, declared, “the use of poison in any 
manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. 
He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war.”32 Similarly, in 
rejecting Admiral Lord Dundonald’s proposal to use sulfur dioxide against the Russians, 
the War Department declared the effects of the gas would be “so horrible that no 
honorable combatant” would use them.33 As with earlier criticisms, these declarations 
were focused on the morality and honor of using chemical agents in warfare. Both cases 
illustrate that although there was renewed interest in utilizing chemical substances in war, 																																																								
30 Wyndham D. Miles, “The Idea of Chemical Warfare in Modern Times,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
31, no. 2 (1970): 299. 
31 Guy R. Hasegawa, “Proposals for Chemical Weapons during the American Civil War,” Military 
Medicine 173, no. 5 (2008): 499. 
32 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Article 70 
(1863). 
33 Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 34. 
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there was still a prevalent belief that the use of poisoned gas would violate honorable 
wartime conduct. 
The chemical discoveries also came during a climate of increased interest in 
codifying a universal set of laws governing wartime conduct.34 Clauses limiting the use 
of chemicals in warfare were included in several of the agreements that resulted from this 
desire to establish the guidelines of wartime engagement at the end of the 19th century. 
The first such effort was the Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War. In the 
summer of 1874, delegates from 15 European States convened in Brussels at the 
invitation of Tsar Alexander II to discuss a set of proposed guidelines for wartime 
conduct. Article XIII of the proposal stated that “the use of poison or poisoned weapons” 
is “strictly forbidden”. 35 The guidelines were adopted by the Convention on August 27, 
1874 but remained unratified since some countries were reluctant to accept them as 
binding.36 Although it was never in force, the sentiments expressed in the Brussels 
Convention draft had a strong influence on the agreements that followed. 
 Twenty-five years later, another assembly was convened on the invitation of 
Russia in order to, in part, “revise the Declaration concerning the laws and customs of 
war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels”.37 Like its forerunner, the 1899 
Hague Peace Conference looked to establish guidelines regarding war that would be 
followed by the signing parties.38 One major topic of discussion for the 26 states 
represented at the Conference was the possibility of establishing limitations on various 																																																								
34 Peter Holquist, The Russian Empire as a “Civilized State” (Washington D.C.: The National Council for 
Eurasian and East European Research, 2004). 
35 “Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. 
Brussels, 27 August 1874,” International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed October 20, 2018, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Count Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov, “Russian Circular” (1899). 
38 Thomas Erskine Holland, The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as Defined by the Hague Convention 
of 1899 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1904). 
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types of weapons including firearms, explosives, powders, projectiles, torpedoes, and 
ship rams.39 Although the delegates were unable to reach consensus on limitations for 
many of these weapons, they were able to come to an agreement regarding the use of 
chemicals and other poisons. Article 23 of the Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, which was taken from Article 13 of the Brussels 
Convention, broadly asserted that “it is especially prohibited: to employ poison or 
poisoned arms.”40 Furthermore, Declaration (IV, 2) of the Conference addressed the use 
of chemical gases more specifically, stating that the contracting states agreed “to abstain 
from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases.”41 The declaration was proposed by Captain Scheine, the delegate 
representing the Imperial Russian Navy, who stated that “as the task of the Conference is 
to limit the means of destruction, it seems logical to prohibit the employment of” 
projectiles that spread asphyxiating and deleterious gases.42  
At the time of the Conference, none of the recently discovered gases had actually 
been used on the battlefield, but proposals for their use had been considered at several 
different times and by several different countries during the 19th century.43 This interest 
in the military potential of chemical weapons made addressing the use of gases during 
war a matter of consideration for the delegates at the conference. For the majority of the 
states represented at the proceedings, the lack of proven effectiveness of chemical 
weapons made it easier for the signatories of the first Hague Peace Conference to 																																																								
39 Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 15.  
40 Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899. 
41 “Declaration (IV, 2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases. The Hague, 29 July 1899,” International 
Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2531E92D282B5436
C12563CD00516149. 
42 The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences. Translated by the Division of International Law of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York: Oxford University Press, 1899, 296. 
43 Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 15-16. 
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preemptively prohibit their use, as they were not giving up an existing option in their 
arsenal.44 The American delegation, however, objected to banning the use of such 
weapons while “the question of asphyxiating gases is still intangible, since projectiles of 
this kind do not really exist.”45 Ultimately, Declaration (IV, 2) was signed and adopted as 
documented in Appendix 1. The result was a declaration that marked the first ratified 
multilateral agreement to restrict the use of chemicals in weapons during war.  
 The 1899 Hague Peace Conference Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases 
was not without its limitations, however. The Conference results only applied during a 
war between contracting parties. If a non-contracting state was involved, the agreement 
ceased to be binding on the participants.46 Six of the affirmative votes for Declaration 
(IV, 2) were made on the condition of unanimity. Additionally, the declaration only 
asserted the abstention from the “use of projectiles the sole object of which is the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases”.47 This excluded projectiles that emitted 
poisonous gas as a secondary effect such as picric acid filled shells, which were used as 
explosives but released arsenic gas as a byproduct of the explosion.48 The declaration also 
excluded the release of gases from stationary containers. This exclusion became 
consequential during World War I.  
 A second Hague Peace Conference was held in 1907. First proposed by President 
Theodore Roosevelt and initiated by Tsar Nicholas II, the conference was attended by 
delegates from 43 states.49 It reaffirmed many of the clauses previously outlined in the 
1899 Hague Peace Conference. The 1907 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 																																																								
44 Ibid. 16. 
45 The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences. 283  
46 Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 35. 
47 “Declaration (IV, 2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases,” International Committee of the Red Cross. 
48 Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 4. 
49 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Hague Convention,” Encyclopaedia Britannica. June 8, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Hague-Conventions.  
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Customs of War on Land once again reiterated that the use of “poison or poisoned 
weapons” is “especially forbidden”.50 The second Hague Conference did not issue 
another declaration regarding the use of projectiles containing asphyxiating gases. The 
existing declaration from the 1899 conference combined with no instances of modern 
chemical weapon use on the battlefield meant that the issue of chemical warfare was of 
low priority to the delegates in 1907.51 
 
WORLD WAR I 
 
 On April 22, 1915, the Germans discharged chlorine gas on the French troops 
positioned in Ypres, Belgium.52 They hoped that the new technology would break the 
defensive stalemate that was dominating the war and swiftly give rise to a decisive 
victory.53 The attack at Ypres marked the first use of chemicals as a stand-alone, lethal 
weapon and its deployment demonstrated that such weapons could be effective on the 
field of battle; over 1,000 French and Algerian soldiers were killed and an additional 
4,000 injured as a result of exposure to the chlorine.54 Although such an attack violated 
the spirit of the Hague Peace Conferences, the Germans avoided breaking the letter of the 
law by releasing the gas from stationary canisters.55 This loophole proved to render the 
Hague Conferences obsolete. The attack was met with outrage by Allied countries, which 
stressed the suffering and painful deaths experienced by the soldiers exposed to 
																																																								
50 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907. 
51 Detlev F. Vagts, “The Hague Conventions and Arms Control,” The American Journal of International 
Law 94, no. 1. (2000): 31-41. 
52 Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 5. 
53 Fitzgerald, Gerard. J. “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I.” American 
Journal of Public Health. 98, no. 4 (2008): 611-625.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare (United States of America: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 17. 
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chlorine.56 But even as the Allies looked to exploit the Germans’ use of gas for moral 
propaganda back on the home front, they also worked to quickly retaliate in kind.57 As 
Lieutenant General Ferguson, the commander of the British II Corps, summarized the 
sentiment, “it is a cowardly form of warfare which does not commend itself to me or 
other English soldiers. We cannot win this war unless we kill or incapacitate more of our 
enemies than they do of us, and if this can only be done by our copying the enemy in his 
choice of weapons, we must not refuse to do so.”58 The success of the attack on Ypres 
was enough incentive to overcome any lingering reluctance to use chemical weapons on 
both sides of the conflict.  
Over the course of World War I, around 124 thousand tons of gas were used 
resulting in approximately 1.3 million casualties.59 Each year of the war saw an increase 
in the amount of chemical weapons produced and employed. By 1918, 65,160 tons of 
poison gas was being expended per year.60 Although lachrymators and sternutators were 
employed as irritants to hassle enemy troops, most of the gases used were the new 
compounds that had been discovered in the 18th and 19th century: chlorine gas, phosgene, 
and mustard gas.61 The massive number of battlefield casualties resulting from the use of 
chemical weapons sparked an offensive and defensive arms race. Countries hurried to 
develop protective equipment for troops, find more efficient methods of distributing the 
gases, and discover new chemicals suitable for use on the battlefield.62 By the end of the 
																																																								
56 Hugh R. Slotten, “Humane Chemistry or Scientific Barbarism? American Responses to World War I 
Poison Gas, 1915-1930.” The Journal of American History 77, no. 2 (1990): 481. 
57 Ibid. 18. 
58 “Poison Gas in World War I,” McGill University, accessed April 18, 2019, 
https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/p/Poison_gas_in_World_War_I.htm.  
59 Ibid. 13.; Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 5. 
60 Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 5. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Spiers, Chemical Warfare, 13. 
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war, the two sides combined had assessed upwards of 3,000 chemicals for their potential 
as weapons; roughly 50 of these compounds were used during battle.63  
 
THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 
 
 As a result of World War I, the inter-war years saw significant discussion about 
the future of gas warfare. Many military leaders were wary of banning the research and 
production of chemical weapons over the concern that doing so would leave them at a 
tactical disadvantage.64 Politicians and the general public, however, were hostile to the 
continuation of this method of warfare.65 The strategic effectiveness of chemical weapons 
on the battlefield was also an open question. The efficacy of gas depended greatly on 
factors outside of the military’s control such as wind direction and air temperature. 
Additionally, the invention of protective equipment rendered many gases ineffective.66 
Efforts to ban the use of chemical weapons began with the 1919 Paris Peace Treaties, 
which forbade the possession, manufacture, import, or use of poisonous substances by the 
countries who had lost World War I.67 They did not place any restrictions on the victors 
or attempt to establish any international guidelines regarding the use of poison gases, 
however.  
The first multilateral attempt to address the future role of chemical weapons 
during military conflict came at the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference. During 
the Conference, the United States proposed imposing restrictions on research, 																																																								
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manufacture, and use of poisonous gases and the Committee with Respect to Poison 
Gases was created to assess the merits of such limitations.68  Restricting the use of 
chemical weapons had widespread support in the United States at the time. In the years 
after World War I, the US chemical industry launched a publicity campaign focusing on 
the dangers of chemical weapons and portraying themselves as the first line of defense 
against future attacks. Their efforts, which were successful in obtaining desired protective 
measures such as high tariffs on chemical imports, also served to solidify public opinion 
on the “inhumanity” of chemical weapons.69 Secretary of State Hughes championed the 
proposal to the Conference, a committee of notable figures appointed by President 
Harding, including General Pershing and Assistance Secretary of the Navy Franklin 
Roosevelt, advocated for its adoption, and the senate backed it unanimously.70 
Unfavorable views of gas warfare in the American public and government created 
pressure on the US delegation for action on the issue on the international stage. 
The Committee, which consisted of delegates from Japan, France, Italy, the 
United States, and the British Empire, considered the 8 central questions listed in 
Appendix 2 along with each country’s response to the questions.71 The delegates 
determined that limiting poisonous gases would not be feasible as there was no practical 
way to prohibit or supervise research and production. Additionally, all the countries 
expressed concern that restricting chemical weapons would place them at a disadvantage 
in a conflict against an enemy that was not abiding by the same constraints.72 As a result 																																																								
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of the challenge in effectively limiting the use of poison gas and the risk of military 
disadvantage if the limitations were not universal, the Conference elected to adopt a 
statement condemning, but not imposing additional restrictions on, the use of chemical 
weapons. Article 5 of the Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in 
Warfare stated that: 
 
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices having been justly condemned by the general opinion 
of the civilized world and a prohibition of such having been declared in treaties to 
which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,  
 
The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally 
accepted as a part of international law binding the conscience and practice of 
nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby 
between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.73 
 
The treaty was ratified by the United States, the British Empire, Italy, and Japan but it 
never entered into force since France did not endorse it over opposition to the submarine 
clauses.74   
In another effort to place limitations on the use of poisonous weapons, the newly 
established League of Nations created a committee in 1925 to issue a report on the future 
of chemical and biological warfare with the purpose of avoiding a repetition of the poison 
gas use in World War I.75 In May of the same year, a conference was convened in 
Geneva to discuss the completed report and consider proposals to prohibit the use of 
chemical weapons. Once again facing domestic pressure against the use of chemical 
																																																								
73 “Practice Relating to Rule 74. Chemical Weapons,” International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed 
November 20, 2018, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule74.  
74 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol),” 
U.S. Department of State, September 25, 2002, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm.  
75 Spiers, Chemical Warfare, 44.; The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Geneva Gas Protocol.” 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, July 5, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/event/Geneva-Gas-Protocol.  
	 23	
weapons, the United States introduced a proposal to ban the export of poisonous gas 
stating: 
To the end of lessening the horrors of war and of ameliorating the sufferings of 
humanity incident thereto, the High Contacting Parties agree to control the traffic 
of poisonous gases by prohibiting the exportation of all asphyxiating, toxic, or 
deleterious gases, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices manufactured 
and intended for use in warfare under adequate penalties applicable in all places 
where such High Contracting Parties exercise jurisdiction or control.76 
 
The United States’ proposal was met with three major concerns: that trade and activities 
of the chemical industry could be severely burdened by efforts to distinguish between 
legitimate commercial trade and prohibited poisonous gas exports, that the prohibition 
could prevent the transport of materials between different parts of global empires, and 
that trade restrictions would block gas-producing countries from assisting non-producing 
allies in conflict with belligerents that were using poisonous gas.77 Great Britain, in 
particular, was opposed to this proposal as its Board of Trade strongly objected to the 
restrictions it would place on the chemical industry and the Army Council believed it 
would limit the British Empire’s ability to be prepared for chemical warfare in the case 
that it encountered it during a conflict. After examination of the proposed export ban by 
the Conference’s Technical Committee, most states felt that it would be too difficult to 
implement and that future efforts to restrict poison gas trade should be put on hold until 
the role of chemical weapons in war could be further addressed.78 At the urging of 
France, the delegates decided to instead include a statement prohibiting the use of poison 
gas warfare.79 
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The result was a declaration that was nearly identical in wording to that of Article 
5 of the Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare.80 Of the 137 
states that eventually became parties to the Geneva Protocol, approximately 40 did so 
with reservations stating that if an adverse party did not respect the terms of the 
declaration, they would cease to consider the protocol binding.81 These reservations rose 
out of countries’ concerns that an unqualified agreement to the protocol would leave 
them at a disadvantage against an enemy that did not sign the Geneva Protocol or had 
signed but engaged in conduct that was contrary to the terms of the agreement.  
Critics of the Protocol also noted that while the text captured the overarching 
spirit of chemical disarmament, it did not prevent the development or stockpiling of 
chemical weapons.82 This shortcoming would allow countries to accumulate large 
chemical weapons stockpiles without violating the document.83 It also did not contain any 
methods to verify compliance or penalize violations. Although the delegates considered 
specifying a licensing system to differentiate chemical weapons versus chemicals for 
industrial, medicinal, and agricultural use, they ultimately did not over concerns that it 
would be too difficult to implement and too burdensome on the chemical industry.84  
In 1935, allegations that Italy had used poison gas during the second Italo-
Ethiopian War highlighted the impotence of the Geneva Protocol. Despite significant 
evidence to support the allegations, the Protocol provided no recourse for punishing such 
a violation. Sanctions prohibiting arms deals, financial transactions, and trade were 
applied against Italy under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations but there 
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were no means for addressing its violation of the Geneva Protocol directly.85 Although 
there was nearly complete adherence to the sanctions by all members of the League of 
Nations, the sanctions proved to have no impact on Italy’s behavior towards Ethiopia, as 
they did not include many of the strategic materials that Italy lacked sufficient indigenous 
capabilities for such as oil, coal, and steel.86 The ineffective application of sanctions can 
be attributed to the complex international climate in the lead up to World War II; the 
major powers of the League of Nations, Britain and France, were wary of alienating Italy 
in the face of an increasingly aggressive Nazi Germany.87 As this case illustrates, even 
though many countries had signed the Geneva Protocol and expressed their support for a 
ban on the use of chemical weapons, research and deployment of toxic compounds 
continued throughout the first half of the 20th century.88  
 
WORLD WAR II 
 
 The 1930s also saw a significant scientific development in chemical warfare: the 
creation of nerve agents. Odorless, colorless, and 75 times more lethal than mustard gas, 
nerve gases were accidently discovered by a German chemist researching pesticides.89 
Dr. Gerhard Schrader’s find led to the development of a suite of German 
organophosphate-based chemical weapons: tabun in 1936, sarin in 1938, and soman in 
1944. The Allied forces remained unaware of these new agents for nearly the entirety of 
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World War II.90 Despite the scientific advances of the German chemical warfare program 
and preparations on both sides of the conflict for the use of poison gases, the predictions 
of extensive chemical weapon use during the Second World War proved to be mistaken. 
They were not used in battle on the European front and were only used in Asia by Japan 
against the Chinese.91 China’s military lacked chemical weapons capabilities and so there 
was no threat of retaliation in kind by the Chinese. Incidents of poison gas use by the 
Japanese were well publicized at the time, but with the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, 
there was little inclination to address the violations in the international community.92 It 
was not until American troops began advancing into the Pacific theater that Japan’s use 
of chemical weapons decreased, likely due to the presence of a poison gas-capable enemy 
and warnings of retaliation for such attacks from President Roosevelt.93 
Although the Geneva Protocol did not appear to act as much of a safeguard 
against chemical warfare, concerns on both sides of the conflict about in-kind retaliation 
and facing an enemy with more advanced poison gas capabilities proved to be strong 
deterrents throughout the war.94 British intelligence reports assessed that both Germany 
and Japan were “capable of introducing offensive gas warfare on a large scale if and 
when they consider it desirable.”95 Britain feared that it would be outmatched if it 
initiated chemical weapons attacks against either country. These assessments turned out 
to be massively overestimated. Although Germany had stockpiled over 10,000 tons of 
blister, choking, and harassing agents, the majority of it was stored in bulk rather than in 
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munitions and their delivery systems had repeatedly failed in field tests.96 With a limited 
number of filled chemical munitions and no working delivery systems, Germany was not 
prepared to wage a chemical warfare campaign. Similarly, reports of Japan’s chemical 
capabilities did not capture the full situation.97 Japan had not experience gas warfare in 
World War I and had only begun manufacturing chemical agents in the early 1930s. 
Although the Japanese used chemical weapons against China, poison gas was never fully 
integrated to the military as a battlefield weapon.98 The Japanese armed services never 
organized a service dedicated to chemical warfare and struggled to outfit their troops with 
protective equipment. While their poison gas capabilities proved effective against the 
Chinese, they were not prepared for chemical warfare against an opponent with in-kind 
retaliatory capabilities.99 
Both the Germans and the Japanese suffered from similar misleading intelligence. 
Germany believed that Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the other major 
European powers had greatly increased their chemical weapons capabilities since the end 
of World War I. According to the head of Germany’s chemical weapons operations, 
General Lieutenant Herman Ochsner, “the general impression held in Germany was that 
in all matters pertaining to gas warfare we lagged seriously behind foreign powers.”100 
Japan had virtually no information on British, Soviet, or American poison gas 
capabilities. As a consequence, the Japanese military was very cautious to avoid 
provoking chemical retaliation from these countries out of fear that their chemical 
weapons programs were more advanced than the Japanese program.101 
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Although assessments of the opponents’ poison gas capabilities were largely 
overestimated by both Allied and Axis powers, the fear of being outmatched in chemical 
warfare was a strong incentive for restraint. By the end of the war, the lack of poison gas 
use combined with the advent of nuclear weapons meant that chemical weapons had 
temporarily fallen out of the international discourse; there were no attempts to further 
restrict the use of chemical weapons at the international level for nearly two decades.102  
 
THE COLD WAR 
 
 Chemical disarmament remained of secondary importance until the end of the 
1960s. Reporting on the use of irritants and chemical defoliants in Vietnam brought the 
issue of chemical weapons back into the public light both in the United States and in the 
international community.103 The United States asserted that defoliants were not chemical 
weapons and therefore their use did not violate its prior position of no first use for 
chemical warfare.104 In response to that argument, Hungary raised the subject before the 
United Nations in 1966 with the request for a resolution mandating compliance with the 
Geneva Protocol and pronouncing “the use of chemical … weapons for the purpose of 
destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted an international 
crime”.105 This would have redefined chemical weapons to include substances such as 
defoliants, which impacted people’s homes, sources of food, and ways of life. Opposition 
by the United States and other Western countries prevented the adoption of Hungary’s 																																																								
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proposed resolution; however, a revised resolution declaring the objectives and spirit of 
the Geneva Protocol a part of customary international law and encouraging states to 
assent to the Protocol was passed unanimously.106 A year later, Malta again raised the 
issue of chemical weapons before the United Nations, suggesting that the Geneva 
Protocol was outdated and should be revised.107 Many countries, primarily the Soviet 
Union and its allies but also Sweden, opposed this suggestion over the concern that the 
revision process could lead to weakened prohibitions on chemical weapons use.108 In the 
end, no revisions occurred and disarmament efforts remained focused on drafting a new 
agreement.109   
The UN Secretary-General released a report on chemical and biological weapons 
in 1969. The report highlighted the dangers of the widespread use of chemical agents in 
war and assessed that the risk of proliferation was high.110 In conjunction with the report, 
the Secretary-General also encouraged all states to agree to the Geneva Protocol and 
recommended that they work towards establishing a convention to ban the development, 
manufacture, stockpiling, and use of all chemical and biological agents.111  
Although discussion continued, further progress on chemical disarmament 
remained elusive throughout the 1970s. There was no special working group dedicated to 
the subject and no joint draft text for states to conduct negotiations around. This made it 
difficult to advance any ideas for disarmament on the international stage.112 It was not 
until 1980 that the UN Conference of Disarmament created a working group on chemical 
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weapons that was tasked with establishing a rolling text for a ban on such agents.113 The 
basic structure of the rolling text was based on a draft submitted to the working group by 
the United States in 1984. A major area of contention in the draft over the next several 
years was the section on verification and challenge inspections. The United States 
insisted on an effective verification regime stating that it would “not accept…a ban 
without sound machinery of verification.”114 The original draft submitted by the US 
government in 1984 allowed for states party to request challenge verification inspections 
of another signatory at any time and in any location.115 The verification mechanism 
would involve mandatory onsite inspections by an international body to ensure that the 
restrictions outlined in the CWC were being followed.116 This proposal was met with 
significant opposition from the Soviet Union and its allies. They opposed the 
involvement of foreign personnel in their industrial establishments.117 Instead, they 
argued for national control and verification rather than international oversight. Since the 
United States and other Western countries viewed national supervision as a nonstarter, 
this remained an obstacle to an international ban on chemical weapons throughout the 
1980s.118 
International interest in reaching an agreement was further spurred by Iraqi use of 
tabun and mustard gas against Iran and Kurdish populations.119 In response to these 
events, a conference was assembled in Paris during January of 1989 to reaffirm the 
international community’s stance against the use of chemical weapons. The gathering 																																																								
113 “History,” OPCW. 
114 “Chemical and Biological Weapons Chronology.” Federation of American Scientists, accessed April 28, 
2019, https://fas.org/nuke/control/bwc/chron.htm.  
115 Amber Teitt, Public Policy in the United States: Chemical and Biological Warfare, Roanoke College, 
26 
116 Bernauer, A Guide to the Negotiations, 225 
117 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, CB Disarmament Negotiations, 309 
118 Bernauer, A Guide to the Negotiations, 225 
119 “Iraq,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2015, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iraq/chemical/.  
	 31	
was attended by 149 countries and issued a declaration on the final day reiterating the 
participating states’ commitment to not utilize chemical weapons and calling for renewed 
discussions on a global ban.120  
However, with no international convention on the immediate horizon, several 
countries resorted to bilateral agreements restricting the use and possession of chemical 
agents in the early 1990s. The United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in 
1990 outlining their joint intent: 
  
(a) to cooperate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient 
destruction of chemical weapons; 
(b) not to produce chemical weapons; 
(c) to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels; 
(d) to cooperate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection 
procedures; and 
(e) to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states 
to become parties to the multilateral convention.121 
 
Two years after that agreement, the governments of India and Pakistan followed suit and 
issued a declaration agreeing not: 
  
(a) to develop, produce or otherwise acquire chemical weapons; 
(b) to use chemical weapons; 
(c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons.122 
 
While an international ban on chemical weapons remained stalled on several fundamental 
disagreements regarding the extent of the ban and methods of verification, these bilateral 
agreements continued to reinforce the importance of eliminating chemical weapons to the 																																																								
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international community. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union 
was especially significant as it demonstrated that the goal of chemical disarmament was 
an area of common ground that could unite even the often-opposed superpowers.123 
Negotiations on an agreement that would prohibit chemical warfare continued unabated 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 Significant disagreements over the scope of such an international ban lingered. 
Some nations wanted to link chemical and nuclear disarmament.124 Others, mainly 
countries without active chemical warfare programs, wanted assurances of aid in the 
event that they were subjected to a chemical attack. There were also reservations about 
the effect the verification measures would have on the chemical industry.125 In an effort 
to prevent circumvention of military restrictions using civilian industries, negotiators 
proposed that commercial chemical companies also be subjected to reporting 
requirements and onsite inspections of their facilities. Although this was an important 
loophole to close, the proposal produced concern that the intrusiveness would stifle 
legitimate industry activity and place a large burden on companies.126 There were also 
questions regarding the verification regime itself; most of the Western countries favored 
international verification with mandatory inspections but the Soviet-aligned nations 
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preferred national control over the verification process.127 Negotiators also had to 
establish what chemicals, precursors, and related technology would be regulated by the 
international ban.128 In total, it took 12 years of negotiations to reach a convention text 
that had enough consensus to move forward. 
 The Conference on Disarmament adopted a draft of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction on September 3, 1992.129 The agreement, more commonly 
referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was opened for signature on 
January 13, 1993. During the three-day signing conference in Paris, 130 countries signed 
the agreement.130 The signatories also passed the Paris Resolution, which created a 
Preparatory Commission to organize the first conference of state parties and address any 
unresolved negotiations. The Commission met 16 times before the CWC entered into 
force and resolved several issues that were outstanding when the Convention opened for 
signatures including handling administrative business, establishing procedures for 
verification inspections, creating deadlines for submitting the information of facilities 
requiring inspection, and giving recommendations for the frequency of inspections.131 
Some issues, such as instituting further guidelines for inspections and identifying the 
criteria to be used when assessing the properties of chemical compounds, still remained 
unresolved by the time the CWC entered into force but efforts to address them 
continued.132 The Convention text stipulated that its entry into force would be at least 2 																																																								
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years after being opened for signature and at least 180 days after ratification by the 65th 
state. Hungary became the 65th state to ratify the CWC on October 31, 1996, which 
meant that the Convention officially entered into force on April 29, 1997.133 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention was written with the intent of completely 
eliminating the use of chemical weapons in warfare and to prevent their proliferation.134 
The general obligations for the agreement are that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: 
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, 
or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; 
(b) To use chemical weapons; 
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; 
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.135 
 
Unlike previous agreements, which were primarily focused solely on restricting the use 
of chemical agents, the CWC also includes protocols for weapon destruction and 
production facility conversion, limitations on chemical precursors and related technology, 
restrictions on riot control agents, and a verification regime to confirm the State Parties 
are in compliance.136 It also contains procedures for challenging states’ compliance with 
the Convention, methods for addressing violations, and support measures for countries 
that have been subjected to chemical attacks.137 Expanding upon the sentiments expressed 
in earlier attempts to restrict chemical warfare, the Chemical Weapons Convention looks 
to eliminate chemical weapons by regulating all aspects of their existence. 
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The CWC stands as one of the most widely acceded to international arms control 
treaties. Today, 193 countries are members of the Convention (see Appendix 3) and 98% 
of the world’s population lives under its protection.138 As of November 20, 2018, just 
over 96% of the world’s declared chemical weapons have been destroyed under its 
auspices.139 Despite the Convention’s high membership and its success in eliminating 
declared weapons, it has also faced challenges, namely in its ability to ensure complete 
declaration and destruction of stockpiles, curb the use of chemical weapons by State 
Parties, and effectively oversee chemical weapons development and use on an 
international scale without jurisdiction over non-member states and non-state actors such 
as terrorist groups.  
While most of the countries that have acceded to the Convention are in 
compliance with it, several high-profile incidents involving chemical agents in recent 
years have raised questions about the effectiveness of the CWC. Syria, which has been a 
CWC member state since 2013, has been credibly assessed to have employed chemical 
weapons against its citizens on multiple occasions over the past five years.140 In February 
of 2017, the half brother of the North Korean leader died after being exposed to the nerve 
agent VX in what was alleged to have been an assassination attempt by the North Korean 
government, which is not a member state of the Convention.141 Just over a year later, a 
former Russian military officer and his daughter were poisoned by the nerve agent 
Novichok in Salisbury, England. Three other people also became ill and one woman died 
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after exposure to traces of the chemical in the surrounding area.142 These incidents 
highlight the challenges faced by the CWC in eliminating the presence of chemical 
weapons around the world. There are still some countries that have not acceded to the 
Convention and even among the nations that have, it is clear that a small minority 
continue to stockpile and use chemical weapons. The incidents also raise important 
questions about why states comply or do not comply with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. An understanding of what factors influence a state’s compliance or 
noncompliance with the CWC could allow the international community to better limit 
chemical weapons proliferation, work toward the disarmament of countries with active 
programs, and possibly interrupt future occurrences of noncompliance. 
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CHAPTER III – COMPLIANCE THROUGH CHEMICAL 
DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION    
 
 
 
SECTION I – INTRODUCTION 
 
 The majority of the CWC is dedicated to defining prohibited activities and 
substances, outlining procedures for the dismantling of existing chemical weapons 
programs, and establishing methods of oversight to ensure states are following the 
restriction in the Convention. Articles I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, XI, and XII are all related 
to this purpose.143 States that join the Convention are required to implement disarmament 
measures including destroying all stockpiled chemical weapons and dismantling all 
chemical weapons production facilities. They also agree to nonproliferation commitments 
such as prohibitions on the research, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical 
weapons.144 As of May 2019, there are 193 states parties to the Convention, Israel has 
signed the Convention but not ratified it, and Egypt, South Sudan, and North Korea have 
not yet signed or ratified the CWC.145 The majority of the countries that have acceded to 
the CWC have complied with the aspects of it relating to disarmament and 
nonproliferation.146 This includes all of the states that had no chemical weapons programs 
prior to joining the CWC and most of the states that chemical warfare capabilities at 
some point in history. A small portion of the chemical states, primarily Russia and Syria, 
has not complied with disarmament and nonproliferation aspects of the Convention after 																																																								
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acceding, however.147 This chapter will focus on countries that have committed to the 
Convention and examine the factors that have influenced their decision to comply or not 
comply with the CWC since their accession. 
 
SECTION II – HYPOTHESES 
 
Throughout this chapter, compliance with the CWC is defined as adherence by a 
state that has signed and ratified the Convention to the obligations regarding the research, 
production, and use of chemical weapons as outlined in the Convention. Noncompliance 
is determined to have occurred when a state that has signed and ratified the CWC fails to 
observe the guidelines for the research, production, and use of chemical weapons defined 
in the Convention. 
 
Hypothesis 1: if a country has the resources to support a chemical weapons program, it 
will pursue such a program in violation of the CWC. If a country lacks the resources to 
support a chemical weapons program, it will comply with the aspects of the CWC 
relating to the research, production, and use of chemical weapons.  
 
While chemical weapons are much more easily obtained than nuclear weapons, 
they still require resources to obtain. Resources come in two key forms: technical 
infrastructure and scientific knowledge.148 First, a country needs to have the financial 
resources to purchase chemical equipment for manufacturing the agents, obtain precursor 
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materials for use in the manufacturing process, and establish the infrastructure for storing 
the finished chemicals.149  
Second, in addition to needing sources of funding for a chemical weapons 
program, a country also needs individuals who have the scientific knowledge to develop 
and oversee the production of chemical weapons. Although many compounds used as 
chemical weapons can be produced in relatively simple reactions, producing them on a 
sufficient scale to be used as weapons requires a solid understanding of chemistry and 
chemical engineering.150 More advanced agents, such as nerve agents, necessitate even 
more sophisticated procedures including temperature controlled reactions and safeguards 
to protect against exposure to the deadly compounds. Even the simpler agents can pose 
technical challenges due to impurities. Impure substances have shorter shelf lives and are 
not as effective as pure agents. Optimizing the purity of a reaction typically requires 
sophisticated equipment and significant scientific understanding.151 Therefore, a 
successful chemical weapons program involves a country having access to a workforce 
that has scientific skills and knowledge and therefore a developed system of higher 
education.  
It is possible for a country to mitigate some of these resource requirements by 
purchasing entire chemical plants from foreign companies, sending its citizens to 
universities abroad if the domestic educational system is insufficient, or using impure 
chemical agents immediately instead of storing them. In general, however, a lack of 
technical and scientific resources poses a significant hurdle to countries looking to 
develop a chemical weapons program.152 As a result, the absence of resources to support 																																																								
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a program would make signing the CWC relatively low-cost choice, since having a 
chemical warfare capability is not an option. The default assumption is that countries will 
pursue a chemical weapons program if they have the resources and will be unable to 
pursue a program if they do not. Of course, in practice, low resource countries also may 
not be interested in chemical weapons programs and, therefore, the absence of a program 
cannot distinguish whether it is due to capacity and resources or to will. 
 
Hypothesis 2: if a country is facing significant threats to its security and survival, whether 
internal or external, it will pursue a chemical weapons program in violation of the CWC. 
In the absence of significant threats to security and survival, a country will comply with 
the aspects of the CWC relating to the research, production, and use of chemical 
weapons. 
 
A country facing threats to its security and survival will pursue strategies to try to 
counter those threats. This could include developing a chemical weapons program to 
supplement a weak conventional military or as a deterrent against the use of chemical 
warfare by adversaries. Countries that are not facing such threats will not need to pursue 
those strategies. The default assumption is that countries will pursue a chemical weapons 
capability if they are threatened but will not pursue a program in the absence of threats. 
 
Hypothesis 3: if a country is facing domestic pressure to obtain chemical warfare 
capabilities, it will pursue a chemical weapons program in violation of the CWC. If a 
country is facing domestic pressure to refrain from obtaining chemical warfare 
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capabilities, it will comply with the aspects of the CWC relating to the research, 
production, and use of chemical weapons. 
 
Domestic pressures, whether public opinion, corporate or non-governmental 
organization lobbying, or influence from societal elites, play an important role in the 
adoption or lack of adoption of policies. If a country has domestic pressures advocating 
in favor of chemical weapons, the country will pursue a chemical warfare program in 
response to those pressures even in violation of the CWC. If a country has domestic 
pressures against the production and use of chemical weapons, it will therefore comply 
with the portions of the CWC relating to chemical warfare capabilities. The default 
assumption is that countries will surrender to domestic pressures regardless of their 
commitments to the CWC. 
 
Hypothesis 4: if a country has existing domestic norms and values against chemical 
weapons, it will comply with the aspects of the CWC relating to the research, production, 
and use of chemical weapons. If a country has existing domestic norms and values in 
favor of chemical weapons, it will pursue a chemical weapons program in violation of the 
CWC. 
 
 A country more easily adopts international norms if there are already previously 
existing domestic attitudes or practices consistent with the norm. A country with 
historically established internal policies against chemical warfare or other weapons of 
mass destruction will sign and comply with the CWC’s restriction on the production and 
use of chemical weapons because it is simply an international extension of practices that 
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have already been adopted domestically. A country with internal strategies supporting 
chemical weapons use will continue to pursue those programs in violation of the CWC. 
The default assumption is that countries will favor preexisting domestic practices over 
newly adopted international ones. 
 
Hypothesis 5: if a country is facing external pressures from other countries or 
international organizations to obtain chemical warfare capabilities, it will pursue a 
chemical weapons program in violation of the CWC. If a country is facing external 
pressures from other countries or international organizations to refrain from obtaining 
chemical warfare capabilities, it will comply with the aspects of the CWC relating to the 
research, production, and use of chemical weapons.  
 
 External pressures, such as those from other countries or international 
organizations, play an important role a state’s decision to adopt or not adopt policies. 
Concerns about reputational standing in the international community or among close 
partners can influence a state’s decision to commit to or not commit to and comply with 
or not comply with international agreements.153 If a country is facing external pressures 
from other states or international organizations that whose opinions are important to the 
country, such pressure will induce the country to sign and comply with the CWC. If a 
country is facing external pressures from important allies or international organizations to 
pursue or maintain a chemical weapons capability in violation of its commitment to the 
CWC, it will do so. The default assumption is that states will yield to external pressures 
regardless of the commitment they made to the CWC. 
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SECTION II – COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE IN NON-CHEMICAL 
STATES 
 
The vast majority of the world’s counties have never had or pursued a chemical 
weapons program. Nearly all of these countries have signed the CWC, see Appendix 3, 
and remain in compliance with the program development and weapons use aspects of the 
agreement.154 This section examines the group of states that historically have not had a 
chemical weapons program, have signed the CWC, and have not developed a program 
since acceding to the agreement. I examine four different countries: Saudi Arabia, 
Uzbekistan, Argentina, and Cameroon. These states were selected because they are 
representative of the other non-chemical countries that have signed the CWC. They span 
a range in terms of their wealth and economic development, are located in different 
regions around the globe, and have different structures of government. In selecting the 
case studies, I attempted to incorporate a wide range of wealth, location, and political 
structure to allow for the contrast of states within each category. The cases illustrate 
broad support for hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 and mixed results on hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
SAUDI ARABIA  
 
 Saudi Arabia signed the CWC on January 20, 1993 and ratified it on August 9, 
1996.155 It maintains that it has never had a chemical weapons program and there is no 
open source evidence to suggest that had chemical warfare capabilities prior to or in the 																																																								
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wake of its accession to the CWC. There is also no evidence that it intends to pursue such 
capabilities.156  
Saudi Arabia has all of the major resources that would be required to pursue a 
chemical weapons program. It has significant financial resources including a $69.4 
billion (US dollars) military budget in 2017.157 In addition to sources of funding, Saudi 
Arabia has also invested heavily in higher education over the past decade. The country 
has 28 public universities and a growing private sector.158 To supplement its indigenous 
higher education system, the state has sponsored the King Abdullah Scholarship Program 
since 2005, which provides funds for students studying at universities abroad.159 Many 
students use the scholarship to pursue science, technology, math, and engineering degrees 
at top-ranked schools in the United States, China, India, and South Korea.160 After 
obtaining their degrees, the students are obligated to return to Saudi Arabia for 
employment thereby contributing to the country’s workforce.161 Through its indigenous 
tertiary schools and the King Abdullah Scholarship, the Saudi education system is robust 
enough to generate graduates with the technical skills and expertise needed to sustain a 
chemical weapons program. The country is already able to support large chemical 
industries surrounding petroleum production and agriculture.162 
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Saudi Arabia also has resources in existing military infrastructure that could be 
utilized in a chemical weapons program. In the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia obtained a 
limited arsenal of CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. The CSS-2 missiles were 
originally designed to carry nonconventional payloads but were modified for use with 
conventional warheads before being delivered to Saudi Arabia.163 There is also reporting 
suggesting that Saudi Arabia obtained more advanced CSS-5 ballistic missiles from 
China in the mid-2000s that were similarly modified to carry conventional payloads 
before delivery.164 Although altered in design, Saudi Arabia has ballistic missile 
technology that was originally designed for use with unconventional payloads, which 
could give them a potential delivery system if it chose to pursue a chemical weapons 
program. Therefore, given the elements outlined above, Saudi Arabia’s choice to sign the 
CWC and remain in compliance by not pursue a chemical weapons program must be 
rooted in factors beyond the availability of resources.  
The Saudi security environment appears not to provide answers, either. Saudi 
Arabia is located in an unstable and conflict-prone region of the world. In 2017, the 
Middle East had the highest average military spending as a portion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) with a value of 5.2%. For comparison, no other world region expended 
more than 1.8% of its GDP on military endeavors.165 This discrepancy highlights the 
continuing security threats faced by countries within the Middle East. In addition to being 
located in a region with significant military buildup, many of Saudi Arabia’s neighbors 
are states that have confirmed or alleged chemical weapons activity. Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
Egypt, Sudan and Israel are all assessed to have had an active chemical weapons program 
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at some point in time.166 Furthermore, Egypt and Israel are not parties of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and are therefore not bound by the regulations of the agreement.167 
Saudi Arabia’s decision not to pursue a chemical weapons program in the face of regional 
conflict and similar programs in neighboring states indicates that either it is confident in 
its abilities to counter unconventional warfare through more traditional means or that 
security concerns are not driving its decision making in regards to chemical weapons. 
Saudi Arabia has one of the largest military budgets in the world and the largest in the 
Middle East by over $50 billion US dollars.168 It also has the backing of powerful 
countries such as the United States.169 Therefore, Saudi Arabia likely feels that 
developing chemical weapons is not necessary to prevent other countries from engaging 
in chemical warfare against it; its conventional military might and the support of its 
western allies is enough of a deterrent.  
In terms of internal threats, Saudi Arabia is relatively stable. The last attempted 
coup against the Saudi regime was in 1969, and the current structure of the military, with 
the security forces divided under the authority of several different members of the royal 
family, would make organizing another coup difficult.170 Since the 1990s, the domestic 
environment has been characterized by anxiety over terrorist threats, economic 
sluggishness, and the possibility of civil unrest as seen in other countries in the region.171 
Saudi leaders have maintained a tight control on activism and dissent during this 																																																								
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period.172 Through such crackdowns, state investment in the economy, and, more 
recently, social reforms, the ruling family has been able to avoid the uprisings seen in 
neighboring countries during the Arab Spring.173 Succession within the royal family has 
the potential to become a flashpoint for internal conflict, but the Allegiance Council, an 
assembly consisting of senior members of the Al Saud family, has endorsed all transition 
changes since its creation signifying that the likelihood of unrest over succession is 
low.174 All of these factors indicate that Saudi Arabia’s decision to forgo developing a 
chemical weapons program is not based on external or internal threats to security or 
survival.  
Although there is not much information readily available on the domestic 
pressures regarding chemical weapons within Saudi Arabia, available information 
suggests that there are not significant pressures either for or against developing chemical 
warfare capabilities from key constituencies. Saudi Arabia has so far refrained from 
pursuing WMDs and has consistently advocated for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East 
in an effort to prevent its regional rival Iran from obtaining nuclear weapon capabilities; 
however, its officials have not expressly ruled out pursuing such avenues in the future.175 
For example, Saudi Arabia raised complaints with the United Nations Secretary-General 
over Egypt’s use of poison gas in Yemen in the 1960s.176 Saudi press statements and a 
statement by Major General Salah El-Din Salim in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
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however, expressed approval of Arab states obtaining chemical warfare capabilities.177 
More recently, Saudi Arabia has loudly condemned the recent uses of chemical weapons 
in Syria and called for a stronger international response to the infractions. A similar trend 
can be seen with nuclear weapons. Saudi officials have called for the elimination of 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East but have also not removed the potential for 
developing their own program.178 Saudi Arabia has warned it will pursue nuclear 
capabilities if Iran develops nuclear weapons.179 These statements suggest that there are 
not currently strong domestic pressures towards or against proliferation within in the 
country. Therefore, domestic pressures are not likely playing a significant role in Saudi 
Arabia’s compliance with the CWC at this time. 
Although Saudi Arabia had no domestic laws prohibiting the production and 
presence of chemical weapons within the country prior to acceding to the CWC in 1996, 
its consistent support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East since it was proposed by 
Egypt in 1990 suggests that there were at least some preexisting domestic norms against 
chemical weapons.180 Even prior to its support for a WMD-free zone, Saudi Arabia also 
backed the joint Iranian and Egyptian proposal for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the 
Middle East in 1974.181 This historical pattern of support for disarmament indicates that 
the Saudi decision to sign and comply with research, production, and use portions of the 
CWC could have been influenced by historically constructed domestic norms.  																																																								
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Saudi Arabia is a member of the Arab League, a confederation of 22 Arab states 
founded in 1945 with the mission to promote collaboration on matters of common 
interest.182 The Arab League as a whole has strongly advocated for a WMD-free zone in 
the Middle East. At the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and 
Extension Conference, it pushed for and achieved the adoption of a resolution that called 
for steps to be taken to establish a WMD-free zone.183 In 2010, after no action was taken, 
it threatened to derail the 2010 NPT Review Conference unless the international 
community, specifically the United States, Russia, and Britain, agreed to a conference to 
discuss a plan of action for creating a Middle Eastern zone free of WMDs. When the 
conference was postponed, the Arab League once again threatened to hold the NPT 
Review Conference consensus hostage unless the WMD-free zone conference was 
rescheduled.184 Given Saudi Arabia’s membership in the Arab League and the League’s 
continuing efforts to prohibit the presence and use of WMDs in the Middle East, it is 
likely that Saudi Arabia would have felt pressure from the other states in the 
confederation to oppose the development and use of chemical weapons.  
Saudi Arabia is also a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which 
is a treaty that entered into force in 1975 and outlaws the use of biological weapons.185 It 
signed and ratified the BWC in 1972. Article IX of the BWC states that, 
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Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognised objective of effective 
prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue 
negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective 
measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and 
for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and 
means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical 
agents for weapons purposes.186 
 
Although unenforceable, this article was included to encourage states to continue 
working towards a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. Saudi Arabia’s accession to the 
BWC could have placed pressure on the country to also accede to the CWC. 
Given the evidence outlined above, the case of Saudi Arabia best illustrates 
hypotheses 4 and 5. Saudi Arabia’s backing of a Middle Eastern nuclear-free zone since 
the 1974 and a WMD-free zone since 1990 indicates that it likely had domestic norms 
opposing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, 
prior to acceding to the CWC. This supports the argument in hypothesis 4 that countries 
with preexisting norms against chemical weapons will sign and comply with the aspects 
of the CWC covering research, development and use of chemical weapons. In terms of 
hypothesis 5, Saudi Arabia’s membership in the Arab League and its ratification of the 
BWC would constitute external pressures against the development of a chemical weapons 
program. It is therefore consistent with that hypothesis that Saudi Arabia has signed and 
complied with the research, production, and use aspects of the CWC. The case of Saudi 
Arabia directly contradicts hypothesis 1. Although it has the resources to support a 																																																								
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chemical weapons program, the Saudis have not yet pursued one. This case also 
contradicts hypothesis 2. Saudi Arabia is located in a region with significant unrest but 
has not developed chemical warfare capabilities in violation of its commitment to the 
CWC. This could be because Saudi Arabia feels that the threats it currently faces to its 
security can be handled with its conventional military and the support of its Western 
allies. Therefore, while Saudi Arabia faces threats to its security, they may not be 
threatening enough to push it to resort to chemical weapons to address them. Hypothesis 
3 does not apply to Saudi Arabia, as it does not face domestic pressures specifically for or 
against chemical weapons. 
  
UZBEKISTAN 
 
 Uzbekistan signed the CWC on November 24, 1995, four years after gaining its 
independence during the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.187 It ratified the treaty 
eight months later on July 23, 1996.188 Although Uzbekistan is assessed to have never 
had a chemical weapons program, it inherited chemical weapons infrastructure from the 
Soviet Union when it gain its independence.189 The Chemical Research Institute, located 
in Nukus, Uzbekistan, was a research and testing site for the Soviet chemical weapons 
program. According to a Soviet defector who worked in the chemical weapons program, 
the Chemical Research Institute was used to synthesize and test batches of nerve 
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agents.190 After Uzbekistan joined the CWC, it began efforts to decontaminate and 
dismantle this facility. With the assistance of the United States, the Chemical Research 
Institute had been completely taken apart by 2002.191  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Uzbekistan faced economic adversity as it 
transitioned to an independent economy and Soviet-style welfare programs collapsed. 
The period saw high inflation and partial de-industrialization in Uzbekistan and the larger 
region.192 Since the country’s independence, the World Bank has labeled Uzbekistan as 
either a “low-income economy” or a “lower-middle income economy.”193 Military 
spending as a percentage of the country’s GDP has been decreasing since a high of 1.6% 
in 1999. In 2003, the last year for which there is data, the amount was down to 0.5% of 
the GDP.194 Given the stagnant economy and limited spending on military endeavors, it is 
unlikely Uzbekistan has the financial resources to support a significant chemical weapons 
program. In addition to lacking sources of funding, Uzbekistan has struggled to 
modernize and expand its higher education system.195 In 2014, there were only enough 
spots at the tertiary level for 1 out of every 10 secondary school graduates.196 Due to the 
limited access and resources to higher education within the country, it is unlikely that 
Uzbekistan would have the technical knowledge or skills needed to research and develop 
a chemical weapons program.  
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Based on the elements outlined above, Uzbekistan lacks the financial and 
technical resources needed to support the independent development of a chemical 
weapons program, however, inherited infrastructure from the Soviet Union could have 
helped jumpstart such a program.197 Although the Chemical Research Institute would 
have been a significant asset for Uzbekistan if it had decided to pursue a chemical 
weapons program, the facility likely would not have been enough to overcome the 
resource deficits the country faces in terms of funding or technical expertise; given its 
limited higher education opportunities and low military spending, Uzbekistan would 
likely have difficulty staffing the facility and procuring the materials needed to conduct 
research. Therefore, Uzbekistan’s decision to sign the CWC, remain in compliance with 
the agreement, and refrain from developing a chemical weapons program could have 
been influenced by its lack of resources to sustain such a program. 
Uzbekistan resides in a region that has experienced turmoil in the wake of the 
Soviet breakup due to ethnic, religious, and political tensions.198 The division of territory 
and resources has led to disputes with all of its neighbors throughout the past several 
decades.199 While disagreements have been frequent amongst the former Soviet republics 
since their independence, Uzbekistan is considered one of the region’s major military 
powers and therefore would not need an unconventional program such as chemical 
weapons to supplement its conventional military strength.200 
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Internally, Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with a highly centralized political 
system.201 It has faced domestic threats from terrorists and militants. This has led to 
crackdowns on Muslims and political opponents, which has, in turn, has increased 
support for extremist groups. 202 Despite such threats, the government has remained in 
control and been able to avoid much of the turmoil that has overturned governments in 
neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.203 It seems unlikely that Uzbekistan would use 
chemical weapons to counter domestic instability when conventional methods have been 
sufficient. 
Although there is unrest in the Central Asian region, there is low risk of chemical 
warfare. None of Uzbekistan’s neighbors have had active chemical weapons programs 
since their independence from the Soviet Union and all are parties to the CWC.204 
Consequently, Uzbekistan does not face a direct threat of chemical weapons use in any of 
its conflicts. The state’s decision to not pursue a chemical weapons capability and instead 
commit to and comply with the CWC is contrary to the presence of internal and external 
threats but may be explained by the lack of chemical weapons in the region and the 
ability to handle current threats using conventional means. 
Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which allowed 
the United States to allocate funding and resources to secure and destroy WMDS and 
related infrastructure in former Soviet states, the United States assisted Uzbekistan with 
the dismantling and decontamination of the Chemical Research Institute among concerns 
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for public and environmental health.205 When speaking about the decision to give up the 
facility, military and public officials highlighted the damage that testing chemical 
weapons had inflicted on the areas surrounding the test site including an incident in 1988 
where thousands of antelope were killed after the winds shifted during open air testing.206 
This emphasis on contamination illustrates the domestic pressures faced by leaders to 
eliminate all remnants of a program that had become unpopular in the country due to 
Soviet mismanagement and improper disposal of chemical waste.207 The Chemical 
Research Institute is situated in the Aral Sea delta, which is already facing a severe 
environmental and health crisis due to pesticide use and water diversion during Soviet 
agricultural practices in the 1960s.208 Local populations feared that the abandoned 
chemical weapons facility could further exacerbate those problems by contaminating the 
surrounding environment.209 Even if Uzbekistan had the resources to support a chemical 
weapons program, domestic opinion regarding the Soviet program would have presented 
a challenge to developing their own chemical weapons. It is likely that domestic 
pressures played a role in Uzbekistan’s decision to eliminate its inherited chemical 
weapons infrastructure and comply with the CWC. 
 Uzbekistan signed the CWC four years after its independence.210 There is no 
evidence of domestic laws regarding chemical weapons during that time, and it is 
unlikely that the state was able to develop other significant domestic practices against 
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chemical weapons in such a short period. Therefore, signing the CWC and subsequent 
compliance likely do not stem from existing domestic norms.  
 While Uzbekistan is a member of the BWC, it did not accede to the treaty until 
January 11, 1996.211 Therefore, its ratification of the biological weapons treaty is unlikely 
to have influenced the signing of the CWC in November of 1995 but could have placed 
external pressure on the country to accede to the CWC and remain in compliance. In 
addition to its signing of the BWC, Uzbekistan is also a member of several international 
organizations that could have placed pressure on it to forgo the development and use of 
chemical weapons. Uzbekistan signed a Partnership for Peace cooperation agreement 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on July 13, 1994.212 The 
Partnership for Peace Program provides the opportunity for non-member states to enter 
bilateral cooperation agreements with NATO on areas of priority for the non-member 
state.213 At the time that Uzbekistan signed its agreement, all of the NATO member states 
had signed the CWC. This may have influenced Uzbekistan’s decision to sign and 
comply with the CWC in an effort to further ties with the organization. Uzbekistan also 
joined the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), now the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in 1992.214 The CSCE was 
designed to address security through politico-military, economic and environmental, and 
human aspects.215 When Uzbekistan joined the CSCE, nearly all of the existing members 
had signed the CWC.216 Given that one of the CSCE’s areas of focus is arms control, 																																																								
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Uzbekistan likely felt pressure to sign and comply with the CWC as part of its 
involvement in the CSCE.217 
 The case of Uzbekistan is an example of hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. Although it 
inherited chemical infrastructure from the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan lacks the resources 
to support a program on its own. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the state has not pursued 
chemical warfare capabilities. Hypothesis 3 addressed the role that domestic pressures 
play in a state’s compliance with the CWC. Uzbekistan faces domestic pressure against 
the presence of chemical weapons and, as outlined in hypothesis 3, has accordingly not 
pursued an indigenous program. Uzbekistan’s accession to the BWC and its involvement 
with the Partnership for Peace Program and the CSCE likely placed external pressure on 
the country to sign the CWC and comply with the aspects of it relating to research, 
production, and use of chemical weapons. This supports the argument in hypothesis 5 
since, in the presence of external pressure to sign and comply with the CWC from its 
accession to the BWC and involvement with the Partnership for Peace Program and the 
CSCE, Uzbekistan has done so. In the instance of hypothesis 2, Uzbekistan faces some 
internal and external threats to its security and therefore would be expected to have 
pursued chemical weapons capabilities. Because it has not, this is a contradiction of 
hypothesis 2. However, given that it has been able to address all of its threats using 
conventional means and none of the countries in the region are known to have active 
chemical weapons programs, it is possible that the threats faced by Uzbekistan have not 
risen to the level that would cause it to feel as though it needed chemical weapons to 
confront them. The fourth hypothesis does not apply in this case, as there is not any 
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evidence that Uzbekistan had developed domestic practices either in favor of or against 
chemical weapons in the time between its independence and its signing of the CWC. 
 
ARGENTINA 
 
Argentina signed the CWC on January 13, 1993 and acceded on October 2, 
1995.218 There is no open source evidence to suggest that it had an active chemical 
weapons program prior to signing the CWC. There is also no indication that Argentina 
has sought to obtain chemical warfare capabilities since its accession to the 
Convention.219 
Argentina has the resources required to support a chemical weapons program. 
Although it is not as well-off as it was a century ago when it ranked among the world’s 
wealthiest countries, reforms and international reintegration have undone some of the 
economic stagnation that occurred during the early 2000s.220 It has a robust chemical 
industry that makes up approximately 10% of the country’s manufacturing revenue.221 
This means it likely has the skilled workforce and the infrastructure to support a chemical 
weapons program. Argentina also has a highly literate population and the average number 
of years spent in school for Argentines is 18 years indicating that a significant portion of 
the population receives at least some tertiary education.222 Argentina’s military spending 
peaked at 4.719% of its GDP in 1978 just two years after a coup d’état installed a military 
junta. Since that point, its military expenditure has been on the decline until it leveled out 																																																								
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at around 1% of the country’s GDP in the early 2000s. 223 Although its military spending 
has decreased in recent years, it would have had sufficient financial resources throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s to invest in a chemical weapons program if interested. Given the 
factors outlined above, Argentina’s decision to sign the CWC and remain in compliance 
with its restrictions on chemical weapons programs is not due to a lack of resources to 
support such a program. 
Argentina faces relatively few external security threats although it has historically 
had a regional rivalry with Brazil.224 The two countries have avoided military conflict 
since 1828 but have continually vied for economic and political influence in the region. 
Since both states transitioned to democratically elected presidents in the 1980s, tension 
between the countries has diminished and remains low.225 
While Argentina has encountered few external threats, it experienced internal 
turmoil due to political unrest throughout the 1900s and early 2000s.226 The period was 
characterized by a series of coups leading to periods of military rule.227 Although there 
has been conflict throughout the past several decades, the political instability and 
frequent changes in leadership would have made developing a chemical weapons 
program to counter the unrest difficult. Additionally, none of the countries in the region 
have had a chemical weapons program, so Argentina does not face the threat of chemical 
warfare in conflict with any of its neighbors. This means that Argentina does not face any 
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external or internal threats that would lend themselves to the use of chemical warfare and 
so its decision to comply with the CWC is in line with that. 
Domestic pressures solidified against chemical weapons following the extended 
periods of military rule in Argentina and the larger South American region throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. The civilian-led government that came to power in Argentina in 1983 
was concerned that the military retained too much influence and independence in the 
country.228 In the late 1980s, Brazil’s government disclosed the existence of a clandestine 
effort by Brazil’s military to pursue nuclear weapons when it was in power. This 
disclosure further amplified concerns within Argentina that an unchecked Argentine 
military could similarly pursue weapons of mass destruction.229 Anti-chemical weapons 
sentiment grew out of these concerns as a way to further restrict the influence and scope 
of the military.230 
In 1991, two years before the CWC opened for signature, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile signed the Mendoza Agreement, which banned the production and use of chemical 
weapons within those countries.231 The agreement was a continuation of efforts to reduce 
military influence in the region. Argentina, plagued by a struggling economy at the time, 
implemented the most extreme demilitarization in an attempt to stabilize its domestic 
affairs.232 Therefore, it is unlikely that domestic pressures would allow Argentina to 
pursue an endeavor that would increase the power and scope of the military such as 
developing a chemical weapons program. The pressure to demilitarize the country after 
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several decades of intermittent military rule played a large role in committing to and 
complying with the CWC.  
 Argentina’s participation in the Mendoza Agreement in 1991 also illustrates that 
even before the CWC entered into force, the state was interested in taking steps to 
prohibit the production and use of chemical weapons regardless of the actions of the 
international community. Argentina is also a member-state of the BWC and the Treaty 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.233 Although 
these agreements focus on the prohibition of biological and nuclear weapons, they 
demonstrate a commitment to broader goals of WMD disarmament and nonproliferation. 
In this manner, Argentina’s signing of the CWC and compliance with the regulations on 
chemical warfare can be seen as a continuation of these domestic policies. 
 Argentina is a member of several international organizations and treaties that 
could have resulted in external pressure to join the CWC. It signed the BWC in 1972 and 
ratified it in 1979.234 The ratification of the BWC, with its emphasis on continuing efforts 
to negotiate a ban on chemical weapons, could have placed external pressure on 
Argentina to sign the CWC upon its open for signature in January 1993. Argentina also 
joined the Australia Group in 1993.235 The Australia Group is a cooperative arrangement 
that seeks to limit the risk of chemical and biological weapon proliferation through 
controlled exports of participating countries. Although there are no legally binding 
obligations associated with the group, its objective is to prevent the spread of chemical 
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and biological agents. In light of this aim, Argentina’s membership likely placed pressure 
on it to ratify the CWC and remain in compliance.  
 The case of Argentina supports hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. Although there have 
been periods of unrest within the country over the past century, Argentina is situated in a 
region with no known chemical weapons programs and the effectiveness of its military, 
which was responsible for several coups during the decades of political turmoil, made 
pursuing unconventional weapons unnecessary. The lack of threats that could not be 
countered by more conventional means and Argentina’s decision to comply with the 
CWC’s restrictions on the development and use of chemical weapons is consistent with 
hypothesis 2. Domestic pressures to demilitarize, including to commit to agreements 
prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, after the decades of strong military presence 
within the country is aligned with the argument in hypothesis 3. Similarly, Argentina’s 
existing domestic practices against chemical warfare and its later adoption and 
compliance with the CWC match the outline of hypothesis 4. In terms of hypothesis 5, 
Argentina’s accession to the BWC and its involvement in the Australia Group likely 
placed pressure on it to sign and comply with the CWC. This supports the argument in 
hypothesis 5 that a country facing external pressure to ratify and abide by the CWC will 
do so. The example of Argentina is a contradiction of hypothesis 1, however. Although 
Argentina possesses the resources to support a chemical weapons program, it has never 
pursued one.   
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CAMEROON 
 
Cameroon signed the CWC on January 14, 1993, the day after it opened for 
signature. It ratified the Convention on September 16, 1996.236 There is no information to 
suggest that Cameroon had a chemical weapons program before its signature or that it has 
pursued such as program since that point.237 
Cameroon does not have the resources needed to sustain a chemical weapons 
program. Although its economy has grown in recent years, it is still facing issues with 
stagnant income, wealth inequality, corruption, and an economy that mainly based around 
oil production.238 The result is that poverty has been a persistent issue over the last couple 
decades. In 2001, 40.2% of the population fell below the national poverty line. That 
number had reduced to 39.9% by 2007 and 37.5% in 2014.239 Given the economic 
difficulties that Cameroon has been facing for the past several decades, it is unlikely that 
it would have the financial resources to support a chemical weapons program. In addition 
to facing economic hardship, Cameroon’s major industries are primarily organized 
around processing various agricultural products; the chemical industry is not considered 
to be a major contributor to the country’s economy.240   
Cameroon faces educational difficulties as well. Only around 75% of its 
population is literate and less than 20% of students enroll in tertiary school.241 This 
means that it likely does not have a workforce with the technical skills and scientific 																																																								
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knowledge needed to develop a chemical weapons program. Therefore, given its 
developing economy, insignificant chemical sector, and rudimentary educational system, 
Cameroon does not have the resources to support a serious attempt to obtain chemical 
weapons.   
In recent years, Cameroon has faced growing internal security threats from 
terrorist groups and secessionists within its Anglophone regions.242 The violence has 
mainly been concentrated in specific areas however, and does not threaten the country as 
a whole.243 This means that while these internal threats may pose risks to local political 
and social stability, they are unlikely to threaten Cameroon’s ruling party, which 
maintains widespread and secure control of the state’s institutions.244 
Cameroon faces relatively few external threats to its safety and security. There 
have been occasional kidnappings and skirmishes along its borders with neighboring 
countries, but these were mainly conducted by terrorist groups and were repelled by 
Cameroonian security forces and therefore not a threat to the country as a whole.245 None 
of the countries within the region are known to have had chemical weapons so Cameroon 
does not face the threat of chemical warfare in disputes with its neighbors.246 Given the 
lack of threats to security and survival that would require unconventional weapons 
capabilities and the absence of chemical weapons in the region, Cameroon has no 
security reasons to pursue a chemical weapons program and violate its commitment to 
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Domestic pressures within the country are primarily focused on alleviating 
economic concerns. From 1970 to 2016, Cameroon’s average capital investment as a 
percentage of GDP was 21.82% and has been on an upward trend since a low point in the 
early 1990s.247 This compares to an average of 1.40% of GDP in military spending over 
the same period.248 The country’s consistently low military expenditure compared to its 
increasing capital investment suggests that domestic priorities are focused on economic 
affairs rather than building up its military capabilities. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
domestic actors in Cameroon would consider investing in a chemical weapons program.  
 In terms of domestic practices on chemical warfare, the Instructor’s Manual 
issued by Cameroon’s military in 1991 states regarding chemical weapons that “the 
restrictions here are clear. It is prohibited to use such weapons against enemy combatants 
as well as against civilian populations.”249 Cameroon signed the CWC in 1993 but the 
Instructor’s Manual indicates that there were already internal policies against the 
possession and use of chemical weapons in place prior to that point.250 Therefore, 
acceding to the CWC would have been an extension of pre-existing domestic norms. 
 At the time of its signing of the CWC, Cameroon was not a member of any 
organization or party to any treaty that could have placed external pressure on it to sign, 
accede to, and comply with the Convention.251 Additionally, given Cameroon’s limited 
resources and the low risk of WMD proliferation within the region, it is unlikely that 
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external organizations and other states would have placed much stress on the importance 
of its decision to join the CWC.252 
 Cameroon is an illustration of hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. It is a country that likely 
does not have the resources or infrastructure required to support a chemical weapons 
program and, consistent with hypothesis 1, has not pursued one. It is also a country that 
faces no significant threats to security or survival and does not reside in a region where 
chemical weapons programs are prevalent. Cameroon has not developed a chemical 
weapons program, which supports the argument outlined in hypothesis 2. Finally, the 
Cameroonian military’s 1991 Instructor’s Manual implies that there already were 
domestic practices against the use of chemical weapons in place before the state signed 
the CWC. This is consistent with hypothesis 4, which states that if a country has existing 
domestic norms against chemical weapons it will sign the CWC and remain in 
compliance with the research, production, and use aspects of the agreement. Hypothesis 3 
and 5 do not apply in this case because there are not significant domestic or external 
pressures advocating for or against obtaining a chemical weapons capability. 
 
 
SECTION III – COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE IN CHEMICAL STATES 
 
Although it is difficult to assess how many countries have had active chemical 
weapons programs since World War I, it is estimated that around 44 states have been 
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capable of chemical warfare at some point since 1914.253 The majority of these countries 
discontinued their programs prior to signing the CWC; only eight countries declared 
chemical weapons stockpiles upon joining the Convention.254 Three states, North Korea, 
Israel, and Egypt, have yet to accede to the CWC.255 This section will focus on the group 
of countries that gave up their chemical weapons programs prior to or upon signing the 
CWC and have complied with the restrictions on program development and weapons use 
by examining Germany, Libya, and the United States as case studies. Each of these 
countries developed chemical weapons programs prior to the creation of the CWC.256 The 
United States and Germany both renounced their programs before the convention 
negotiations were completed. They each signed the agreement in 1993, the same year it 
was opened for signature.257 Libya eliminated its program after negotiations with the 
United States and Great Britain in the early 2000s and acceded to the CWC in 2004.258 
These cases show consistent support for hypothesis 3 and 5 but mixed support for 
hypotheses 1, 2, and 4.  
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GERMANY 
 
Germany signed the CWC on the day it opened for signatures on January 13, 
1993. It ratified the Convention on August 12, 1994.259 It had an active chemical 
weapons program from World War I until its defeat in World War II.260  
Germany leveraged its advanced chemical industry, which was the most 
sophisticated in the world at the time, to develop a chemical weapons program during 
World War I.261 It retained an active program through World War II, even though the 
1919 Treaty of Versailles, which formally ended World War I, reiterated the ban on 
chemical weapons that had been previously established in the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions.262 It specifically targeted the German the chemical weapons program 
stating that “the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly 
forbidden in Germany.”263 While Germany publically declared it was in accord with the 
treaty’s terms, its scientists continued their chemical weapons research in secret.264   
 In the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in World War II, Germany’s chemical 
industry was significantly curtailed. IG Farben, the major chemical and pharmaceutical 
company in the world at the time, was broken up and its directors were tried for war 
crimes, in part, for their role in Nazi chemical weapons programs.265 Although many of 
the resources required to support a chemical weapons program, such as technical 
expertise and scientific knowledge, were still present in Germany in the post-World War 																																																								
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II era, limited sources of funding and increased international scrutiny would have made 
continuing its program difficult in the years following its defeat. As Germany’s economy 
has recovered and international suspicion has decreased in the decades since the war 
however, it is likely that Germany now has the financial and technical resources to restart 
its chemical weapons program if it chose to. Therefore, Germany’s decision to sign and 
comply with the CWC is not based on a lack of resources needed to develop a chemical 
warfare program. 
Germany originally pursued its chemical weapons program in the face of 
significant external threats to its security. Fritz Haber, a German scientist who was a 
strong proponent of the use of chemical weapons, argued that poison gases could help 
break the strategic impasse that the Allied and Central powers found themselves in 
several months into World War I.266 Although this argument proved to be incorrect, it 
was based on a concern over the threats facing the German state from the Allies. 
Similarly, the advancement and expansion of the German chemical weapons program 
leading up to World War II was also in the face of external threats to security.267 In this 
case, there was the added threat of the chemical weapons programs developed by most 
Western powers during World War I; the Nazis remained unsure of how advanced Allied 
programs were throughout the conflict.268 In the post-World War II era, however, 
Germany has faced relatively few threats to security both internally and externally.269 
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Without any significant threats to security or survival, there is little motivation for 
Germany to restart its chemical weapons program in the present.  
Domestic pressures in the wake of World War II were strongly in favor of 
demilitarization.270 In 1954, Germany renounced the production of all types of WMDs 
stating that “the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any 
atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons”.271 It reaffirmed this 
commitment and further stated that it would not seek to acquire or stockpile chemical 
weapons when it signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972.272 This 
postwar stance on chemical weapons was part of a larger movement towards antimilitarist 
sentiments within German society rather than animus towards chemical warfare 
specifically.273 Regardless of the reason for the attitude, public pressures within German 
society that developed after its defeat in World War II likely played a significant role in 
Germany’s decision to sign the CWC and not restart its chemical weapons program.  
Germany’s post-World War II domestic attitudes towards chemical weapons 
extended beyond its renunciation of WMDs in 1954. In 1987, Germany proposed the 
creation of a chemical weapons free zone in Europe.274 Four years later, the 1991 German 
Soldiers’ Manual prohibited the use of chemical weapons by members of the military.275 
All of these instances illustrate that Germany had domestic practices against chemical 
weapons in place before it signed the CWC in 1993. Therefore, acceding to and 
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complying with the aspects of the CWC covering chemical weapons research, 
manufacture, and use can be seen as a continuation of existing domestic norms. 
Both East and West Germany signed and ratified the BWC prior to the CWC 
opening for signature.276 This could have placed external pressure on Germany to sign the 
CWC in 1993 due to its commitment for signatory states to work towards chemical 
disarmament. Germany has also been a member of the Australia Group since 1985.277 Its 
involvement in the group’s efforts to prohibit the proliferation of biological and chemical 
weapons likely placed pressure on Germany to sign and comply with the CWC. Germany 
is also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).278 Of the countries 
that were members of NATO in 1993, 12 of them signed the CWC on the day that it was 
opened for signature and the remaining three signed it one day later.279 This indicates that 
within the NATO community there was strong support for the CWC and therefore there 
likely would have been pressure on Germany to sign the Convention. 
The case of Germany is an illustration of support for hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Although Germany faced significant threats to its security and survival during the period 
leading up to World War I through the end of World War II when it had an active 
chemical weapons program, it has faced relatively few serious threats since it 
relinquished its program. Therefore, its decision to sign the CWC and comply with the 
portions of the agreement governing chemical weapons programs is consistent with 
hypothesis 2. The domestic pressures to renounce WMDs which developed in Germany 
in the wake of World War II and Germany’s subsequent decision to not restart its 
chemical weapons program, to sign the CWC, and to comply with the weapons 																																																								
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development and use aspects of the agreement align with the argument outlined in 
hypothesis 3. Even before Germany signed the CWC, it had domestic practices against 
chemical warfare.  
This situation, where a country with existing domestic norms against chemical 
weapons accedes to the CWC, is in accordance with hypothesis 4. Germany’s 
involvement in the BWC, the Australia Group, and NATO prior to signing the CWC is 
supportive of the argument made in hypothesis 5. It likely faced external pressure due to 
the BWC’s commitment to continuing efforts towards chemical disarmament and the 
support for nonproliferation in the Australia Group and NATO so its signing and 
subsequent compliance with the CWC is in line with the outline of hypothesis 5. The case 
of Germany is a contradiction of hypothesis 1, however. Germany has the resources to 
pursue a chemical weapons program but has not made efforts to restart its program after 
its renunciation.  
 
LIBYA 
 
 Libya acceded to the CWC on January 1, 2004 following negotiations with United 
States and British officials. It started its chemical weapons program in the 1980s and 
maintained its capabilities until it joined the CWC in 2004.280  
Libya’s economy is primarily based on oil production. Expansion of oil 
production combined with a global increase in oil prices in the 1970s led to a boost in its 
economy.281 This gave Libya the financial resources needed to pursue a chemical 
weapons program. Although it lacked the indigenous technical skills and scientific 																																																								
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knowledge needed to develop such a program, Libya was able to compensate by hiring 
foreign companies to build the required infrastructure.282 In this manner, Libya was able 
to overcome its lack of technical and educational resources by obtaining chemical 
factories from Western commercial sources, which could provide state-of-the-art 
equipment that Libya was unable to manufacture domestically.283 This allowed it to 
establish a functional program with a workforce of less than a dozen chemists and 
chemical engineers employed on the project.284 
The fall in oil prices in the 1980s followed by United Nations economic sanctions 
in the 1990s due to Libyan involvement in several terrorist incidents and due to United 
States sanctions on companies and individuals doing business with Libya made 
sustaining a chemical weapons program increasingly difficult.285 Libya had originally 
imported the majority of its thiodiglycol, an immediate precursor to sulfur mustard, from 
foreign suppliers but soon became unable to afford the amounts required to support its 
program and found itself increasingly isolated from the international community.286  
As time progressed, Libya lost most of the financial assets that had allowed it to 
compensate for the lack of domestic resources. By 2003, when Libya began talks to 
renounce its WMD programs, it still had an active chemical weapons program but 
production of chemical agents had not occurred in more than a decade.287 This indicates 
that by the mid-1900s, Libya no longer had the resources to support chemical warfare, 
which likely played a significant role in its decision to surrender its program and sign the 
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CWC in return for sanctions relief; surrendering a chemical weapons program that had 
already been dormant for over 10 years was a small price to pay for reintegration into the 
international community. Libya’s economic situation has not improved substantially 
since then. The outbreak of civil war in 2011 sent the economy into free fall from which 
it is only starting to recover.288 The conflict has also impacted Libya’s already limited 
education system; approximately 11% of schools have been destroyed.289 The result is 
that it is likely Libya still lacks the resources needed to support restarting its chemical 
weapons program.  
The start of Libya’s chemical weapons program came at a time when it was 
looking to expand its influence in the region and when it was facing increasing security 
threats from the Middle East.290 Compared to neighboring countries such as Egypt and 
Israel, Libya had a weak conventional military. Additionally, several Middle Eastern 
states, including Iraq, Egypt, and Syria, were pursuing chemical weapons programs of 
their own.291 Concerns about its ability to remain competitive within the larger North 
Africa – Middle East region likely fueled Libya’s desire to develop a chemical warfare 
capability; having chemical weapons would supplement its conventional capabilities and 
remain in line with developments in the Middle East. 
 By the early 2000s, Libya’s security concerns had shifted, placing a greater 
emphasis on expanding regional influence in Africa instead of in the Middle East. With 
this change came a decreased stress on WMD programs, which were seen as politically 
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important in the Middle East but less so in Africa.292 At the same time, Gaddafi also felt 
increasingly threatened by the United States, particularly by its “Global War on Terror” 
and its adversarial position towards the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.293 In an effort 
to gain assurances that Gaddafi’s government would be allowed to stay in power and to 
end its global pariah status, Libya reached out to British intelligence to express a 
willingness to engage in talks regarding its WMD programs.294 This outreach marked the 
beginning of negotiations that eventually culminated in the elimination and destruction of 
the Libyan chemical weapons program.295 External threats to security played an 
important role the development and the dismantling of Libya’s chemical weapons 
program. The program was developed in response to concerns that lacking WMD 
capabilities would put it at a disadvantage in the region and it was dismantled over the 
concern that having WMD capabilities would lead to continuing isolation on the 
international stage and possibly an invasion by the United States. Therefore, threats to 
security proved to be a significant factor in Libya’s decision to sign and comply with the 
CWC. 
As Libya’s economy faltered under the weight of sanctions from the United 
Nations and the United States, the Gaddafi regime faced increasing domestic pressure to 
remedy the situation.296 In 1993, factions of the Libyan army attempted remove Gaddafi 
from power in a coup.297 Although the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, it illustrated 
the growing discontent with the Gaddafi regime inside the country. The dissent, which 
sometimes manifested in violent unrest, was predominately concentrated among army 																																																								
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officers and Islamic fundamentalists.298 The severity of internal affairs led Gaddafi to 
offer renunciation of the country’s WMD programs in return for lifting of economic 
sanctions and normalization of relations with the international community.299 Although 
not directly related to chemical weapons, domestic pressures to address the deteriorating 
conditions within the country played an important role in Libya’s decision to give up its 
chemical weapons capabilities and join the CWC.  
 In the decades leading up to its accession to the CWC, Libya’s domestic practices 
were primarily in favor of proliferation.300 Therefore, its decision to sign and comply 
with the aspects of the CWC regulating the development and possession of chemical 
weapons was in direct contrast to existing domestic practices. Libya’s consent to the 
CWC cannot then be seen as a continuation of domestic norms.  
 Libya acceded to the BWC on January 19, 1982.301 Given that it did not sign the 
CWC when it opened for signature in 1993, it is unlikely that Libya was influenced by 
the affirmation to commit to chemical weapons disarmament in the BWC. Libya’s pursuit 
of WMDs was met with international condemnation, especially from the United States.302 
In 1996, 33 countries supported a US effort to stymie exports of military technology and 
dual-use materials to Libya. That same year, President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions on 
companies that exported items to Libya that could be used in its WMD programs.303 In 
addition to exerting economic pressure, the United States also declined to rule out the 
possibility of using military intervention to prevent the completion of the chemical plant 
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at Tarhuna.304 Although Libya faced pressure from the United States over WMD 
capabilities, it also had several countries including China, the Soviet Union, South Africa, 
West Germany, and Iran who were willing to either directly provide materials and 
expertise to its chemical weapons program or to turn a blind eye towards companies and 
individuals in their jurisdiction doing so.305 The support of these countries was more 
important to Libya than the pressure from the United States or international 
condemnation. As the United States increased the sanctions on those involved in 
supplying Libya’s chemical weapons program, many countries began curbing their 
exports to Libya. Additionally, states such as West Germany, that had been ignoring the 
activities of individuals and corporations involvement in Libya’s procurement process, 
began prosecuting individuals that exported dual-use goods to Libya.306 This withdrawal 
of support from the countries that had once been major suppliers of Libya’s chemical 
weapons program placed external pressure on the state to relinquish its program and join 
the CWC. 
 The case of Libya supports hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. Although Libya was able to 
develop a chemical weapons program, deterioration of its economic conditions meant that 
by the mid-1990s it lacked the resources to support its program. As a result, it gave up its 
program and has remained in compliance with the CWC’s regulations regarding 
possession and use of chemical weapons as predicted by hypothesis 1. Due to the 
worsening economic environment, Gaddafi faced significant domestic pressure to remedy 
the situation. As described in hypothesis 3, this pressure led Gaddafi to renounce the 
country’s chemical weapons program in return for sanctions relief and reintegration into 
international community. In addition to domestic pressure, Libya also faced significant 																																																								
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external pressure to accede to and comply with the CWC. At first, it was able to resist 
calls to give up its program because it had the support of several countries that were 
willing to supply it with materials and expertise. But as US pressure on the international 
community increased, those countries became less willing to assist Libya’s program. This 
diminished support likely contributed to Libya’s decision to give up its chemical weapons 
and sign the CWC, which is consistent with the argument in hypothesis 5. Libya’s case is 
a contradiction of hypotheses 2 and 4, however. Although Libya still faced significant 
threats to security and survival in the early 2000s, it gave up its program and joined the 
CWC. This move was also was in direct contrast to historic domestic practices in favor of 
chemical weapons development within the country.  
  
UNITED STATES 
 
 The United States signed the CWC on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on April 
25, 1997. The US developed a chemical weapons program in 1917 in response to the use 
of chemical weapons during World War I. It maintained an active program through 
1990.307 
The United States’ chemical weapons program was first developed during World 
War I after the Germans used chlorine gas at Ypres, Belgium.308 The program was 
continued throughout much of the rest of the century. In 1990, the United States and the 
Soviet Union signed a bilateral agreement to stop producing chemical weapons and 
destroy existing stockpiles.309 This marked the official end to the United States program 																																																								
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and the start of the destruction of its stockpiles. At this time the United States still had the 
financial, educational, and technical resources needed to support a chemical weapons 
program. The country was on the cusp of the best economic performance in decades, 46% 
of Americans between the ages of 25 and 34 had attended at least some college, and the 
United States had the world’s largest chemical industry.310 In addition to sufficient 
educational and technical resources to support a chemical weapons program, the United 
States has vast financial resources at its disposal. Its military funding has been among the 
highest in the world over the last several decades with a $686 billion (US dollar) budget 
in the 2019 fiscal year.311 Therefore, the US’s decision to forgo its program, sign the 
CWC, and remain in compliance with the convention is not the result of a lack of 
resources to support a chemical warfare program. 
The United States began a chemical weapons program in response to external 
threats to security presented by the advent of chemical warfare by the Germans in World 
War I.312 Although the incidence of chemical warfare on the battlefield was infrequent 
after World War I, the threat of such weapons remained and so the United States 
maintained its chemical arsenal as a deterrent.313 In 1943, George Merck, the director of 
the US chemical and biological warfare program, issued a report that highlighted, in part, 
the necessity of countering the threat of German chemical weapons.314 Much of the 
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development of the program was driven by global threats such as the Nazis during World 
War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.315  
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an 
arms race, part of which included amassing stockpiles of chemical weapons, in an 
attempt to gain a military and strategic advantage over their rival.316 The end of the Cold 
War, however, marked a reduction in the serious security threats faced by the United 
States.317 Additionally, the United States emerged with substantial conventional military 
and nuclear capabilities. Therefore, the lack of significant threats to its security and 
survival likely played a role in the United States’ accession to the CWC and continued 
compliance with its terms regarding development and use of chemical weapons. 
Domestic reaction to chemical weapons after World War I was mixed. Many were 
opposed to it on moral grounds, claiming it was inhumane and amounted to torture, and 
there was a general pressure to draw down America’s military strength, including disband 
the recently created Chemical Warfare Service (CWS).318 Proponents of chemical 
warfare, however, argued that it was an important capability to have as a deterrent to 
other countries and that due to its low casualty rate it was actually more humane than 
conventional munitions such as bullets and bombs.319 In the interwar period, Brigadier 
General Amos Fries of the 1st US Gas Regiment, representatives from the United States 
chemical industry, and members of the American Chemical Society lobbied on behalf of 
the CWS to make it a permanent branch of the Army. In 1920, their efforts were 
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successful.320 In the wake of World War II, some observers called for the elimination of 
the United States’ chemical weapons program due to the arrival of nuclear weapons and 
its lack of use during the war.321 Once again lobbying by the CWS allowed the program 
to remain active in the peacetime Army.322 By the end of the 1960s, however, domestic 
pressures were beginning to turn against chemical warfare. Public hostility towards 
chemical weapons increased over the use of defoliants in Vietnam, deployment of riot 
control agents in Southeast Asia and the United States, well publicized testing accidents, 
and environmental concerns about chemical waste disposal.323 After near elimination in 
the 1970s as a result of public pressure, the US chemical weapons program was revived 
following revelations about the extent of the Soviet Union’s chemical warfare 
capability.324 Soviet equipment captured from the Egyptians and the Syrians during the 
Yom Kippur War was much more sophisticated than had previously been assessed by US 
officials. The presence of chemical resistant shelters, air filtration systems in vehicles, 
decontamination equipment, and chemical detector kits suggested that Soviet forces were 
well prepared to engage in chemical warfare prompting concerns with in the US army 
that the Soviet Union could seek to deploy chemical weapons in a future war.325 
Although the program was reinstated to counter the Soviet’s Cold War threat, domestic 
support for chemical warfare remained low, a fact that likely hastened the United States’ 
elimination of its program and influenced its decision to sign the CWC in the 1990s and 
remain in compliance with the agreement.  
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 In the decades leading up to the signing of the CWC, the United States had 
already begun to abolish its chemical weapons program. In 1969, President Richard 
Nixon resubmitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which the Senate had declined to ratify 
when it was originally signed, to Congress for ratification.326 This came among a broader 
effort by the Nixon administration to further clarify and reduce the United States’ 
chemical and biological weapons programs; in his presentation of the Protocol for 
ratification, Nixon also renounced the use of biological weapons and reaffirmed the US 
commitment to no first use of chemical weapons.327 The same year, the United States 
stopped manufacturing chemical agents and filling munitions. By the early 1970s, the 
Army planned to eliminate its chemical warfare branch entirely. Although the Cold War 
reversed these plans, the United States showed little interest in maintaining a chemical 
weapons capability, possibly due to a lack of public support and its nuclear capabilities; 
less than a year after reactivating the program, it began talks with the Soviet Union to 
reach a verifiable ban on chemical weapons.328 These actions indicate that the United 
States had established domestic practices and norms against the use of chemical weapons 
prior to signing the CWC in 1993.  
 The United States signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1975.329 This would 
have placed pressure on the US to continue working towards a ban on chemical weapons 
and therefore sign the CWC when it opened for signature. The United States also joined 
the Australia Group in 1985.330 Its membership would have created external pressure to 
sign and subsequently comply with the Convention. The US is also a member of NATO, 
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which saw broad support for the CWC among its participants.331 This widespread support 
from close international partners could have placed pressure on the United States to sign 
and comply with the Convention. In addition to its memberships in international 
organizations, the United States had one of the world’s largest chemical stockpiles in 
1993 and had led negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons.332 A failure to sign the 
CWC by the US would have set a bad precedent for chemical disarmament and hurt its 
reputation as a reliable negotiator in the international community. This role in the 
chemical weapons process likely placed pressure on the United States to sign the CWC 
and remain in compliance.  
 The United States case supports hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. In the wake of the Cold 
War, the United States emerged as a global military power facing few threats to its 
security. Additionally, given its conventional military strength and nuclear capabilities, 
maintaining its chemical weapons capability was unnecessary. The lack of threats and the 
United States’ decision to sign the CWC and comply with its restrictions on chemical 
weapons development and use is an example of hypothesis 2. The movement towards 
eliminating its chemical weapons program over domestic opposition in the 1960s and 
1970s is an illustration of the power of internal pressure as outlined in hypothesis 3. This 
pressure also led to the development of domestic practices against chemical warfare in 
the decades leading up to 1993. Therefore, signing the CWC can be seen as a 
continuation of these domestic policies as described in hypothesis 4. The United States’ 
accession to the BWC, its membership in NATO and the Australia Group, and the role 
that it played in negotiating the CWC all likely introduced external pressure on the 
country to sign the Convention and comply with the aspects of it on chemical weapons 																																																								
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programs. This response to external pressure is consistent with hypothesis 5. The case of 
the United States is a contradiction of hypothesis 1, however. Although it still had the 
resources and capabilities to continue its chemical weapons program, the United States 
has not done so and has remained in compliance with the aspects of the CWC relating to 
the development, production, and use of chemical weapons.  
 
 
SECTION IV – COMMITMENT WITHOUT COMPLIANCE 
 
 A small subset of the countries that developed chemical weapons systems before 
signing the CWC have not entirely given up their programs after their accession. I will 
examine the cases of Russia and Syria in this section. While both countries declared their 
stockpiles upon accession to the agreement and had the stockpiles’ destruction verified by 
the OPCW, recent accusations of chemical weapons use by both countries have raised 
questions about the completeness of their declarations.333 Russia has been assessed by 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States to have used a nerve agent to 
poison a former spy and his daughter in 2018.334 The Syrian military and affiliated groups 
have been accused of using chemical weapons against rebels and civilians in over 300 
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attacks during the country’s civil war.335 These cases demonstrate support for hypotheses 
1, 2, and 4, mixed results on hypothesis 5, and are inconclusive on hypothesis 3.  
 
RUSSIA 
 
 Russia signed the CWC on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on November 5, 
1997.336 It developed a chemical weapons program during War World I and maintained 
an active program throughout the Soviet era until signing a bilateral agreement with the 
United States to eliminate its programs in 1990.337 Although the OPCW declared 
Russia’s chemical stockpile destroyed in October of 2017, the use of chemical weapons 
in a 2018 assassination attempt on a former spy in England that was likely carried out by 
Russian intelligence officers indicates that it still has chemical weapons capabilities.338 
At the time that the agreement with the United States was signed, the Soviet 
Union had all of the necessary resources to support a chemical weapons program. Shortly 
after that agreement, however, the Soviet Union was dissolved and the newly 
independent Russia experienced a period of economic collapse as it transitioned from a 
central command economy to a market-based one.339 Throughout the 1990s, it is unlikely 
that Russia would have had the financial resources to devote to maintaining a chemical 
weapons program, especially considering that it was also supporting a nuclear weapons 																																																								
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program. This lack of resources probably played a role in Russia’s decision to sign the 
CWC in 1993. The Russian economy recovered throughout the 2000s mainly due to 
increased oil revenue.340 Due to this recovery, Russia likely once again has the resources 
to support a chemical weapons program. This change could be a contributing factor to 
Russia’s noncompliance with the CWC. 
As with many countries in Europe, Russia developed its chemical weapons 
program in response to the use of chemical warfare by the Germans during World War 
I.341 It expanded and updated its program during the interwar years in order to match the 
capabilities of other industrial powers. In the wake of World War II and throughout the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union continued research on and production of chemical weapons 
as part of its response to the threats posed to its security and survival by the United States 
and other European powers.342 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, these 
external threats diminished as the newly formed Russia focused on domestic affairs. In 
more recent years, as tensions with the United States and other European powers have 
increased, Russia appears to have produced and utilized a chemical weapon in violation 
of the CWC. The 2018 poisoning of the former Russian spy and his daughter in 
Salisbury, England has been assessed to be a Russian military operation carried out by 
two intelligence officers. The attack used Novichok, a nerve agent developed by Soviet 
scientists in the 1980s.343 It is likely that increased concerns over threats from the West 
has played a significant role in Russia’s decision to violate the CWC. 
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Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys significant domestic support within 
Russia. He won reelection by a large margin with nearly 77% of voters favoring him.344 
After his victory, Putin’s campaign spokesman jokingly thanked Great Britain for 
increasing turnout over their accusations about Russia role in the Salisbury poisonings, 
suggesting that voters had turned out in large numbers to support Putin because of the 
perceived attacks on him from the West.345 Although there is minimal information 
publically available on public opinion within Russia regarding chemical weapons 
programs, the high level of approval that President Putin has, even in the aftermath of the 
Novichok incident, suggests that there is little domestic pressure on him to comply with 
the CWC. 
Throughout the Soviet era, chemical weapons capabilities were pursued in secret. 
Even in the decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the citizens of Russia 
have remained relatively in the dark regarding the extent and capabilities of the Soviet 
Union’s chemical weapons program.346 This domestic practice of secretly researching 
and manufacturing chemical agents appears to have continued in Russia through the 
present day. Although Russia and the OPCW declared its stockpiles destroyed in 2017, 
the poisoning in Salisbury, England raises questions about whether Russia declared its 
entire stockpile or if it has been conducting clandestine research.347 Consistent with its 
previous domestic norms in favor of chemical weapons development and use, Russia 
appears to continue to view chemical agents as a viable weapon.  																																																								
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Russia signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it three years later.348 The inclusion 
of a commitment to chemical disarmament in the BWC could have placed external 
pressure on Russia to sign the CWC in 1993. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Russia assumed its position in the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe 
(CSCE).349 The CSCE’s focus on arms control likely placed pressure on Russia to 
commit to and subsequently comply with the CWC. In the wake of the chemical attack in 
Salisbury, England, over 20 Western countries including the United States, Germany, 
France, Poland, Ukraine, Sweden, Canada, and Australia, expelled Russian diplomats for 
the country’s assessed role in the attack.350 This widespread condemnation of Russia’s 
violation of the CWC likely placed pressure on Russia to acknowledge and address its 
clandestine chemical weapons capabilities. Despite that pressure, as of May 2019, Russia 
has publically maintained it has no chemical weapons capabilities and that it is not 
responsible for the attack in England. Given that Russia has appeared to have produced 
and used chemical weapons in violation of its commitment to the CWC, these external 
pressures towards accession and compliance do not seem to be significant factors for the 
country.  
The Russia case supports hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. Russia has the resources to 
support a chemical weapons program and, as predicted by hypothesis 1, has pursued one 
in violation of the CWC. In recent years, tensions between Russia and the West have 
increased leading to amplified threats to Russia’s security and survival. As outlined in 
hypothesis 2, Russia has produced and used chemical weapons in response to these 																																																								
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threats. Throughout the Soviet era, there were domestic practices of secrecy and 
proliferation. Russia’s noncompliance with the CWC can be seen as a continuation of 
these historic internal policies. Although Russia acceded to the BWC prior to 1993 and is 
a member of the CSCE, which would both likely create external pressure for commitment 
and compliance to the CWC, it has not complied with the research, production, and use 
restrictions outlined in the Convention. It has also not given in to pressure from Western 
countries in the wake of the Skripal attack to declare any clandestine chemical weapons. 
This is a contradiction of hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 3 does not apply to the case of Russia, 
as there does not appear to be significant domestic pressure for or against chemical 
warfare.  
 
SYRIA 
 
 Syria acceded to the CWC on September 12, 2013 after negotiations between the 
United States and Russia in response to reports of chemical weapons use by Syrian 
government forces.351 
 Syria obtained chemical warfare capabilities in the mid-1970s. During that time, 
economic growth rates were high due to an increase in global agriculture and oil 
prices.352 Syria also received foreign assistance, primarily from the Soviet Union and then 
West European companies, which helped overcome some of its lack of indigenous 
resources.353 Throughout the next several decades, it amassed one of the world’s largest 
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stockpiles of nerve agents and mustard gas.354 In 2011, civil war broke out between 
President Bashar al-Assad’s government and pro-democracy opposition supporters.355 
The conflict weakened the economy and further damaged Syria’s already lagging 
education system.356 However, Syria’s significant chemical weapons stockpiling 
throughout the late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s have mitigated the more recent lack of 
indigenous resources. Therefore, Syria likely still has sufficient remnants of its chemical 
weapons program to support its noncompliance with the CWC. 
 Syria pursued its chemical weapons program in response to regional security 
threats. Military asymmetry in its relationship with Israel, which is widely believed to 
have nuclear capabilities, was a primary motivator to gain unconventional weapons 
capabilities.357 These threats have remained undiminished through the present day. In 
addition to external threats, the 2011 civil war introduced a significant internal threat to 
the security and survival of the Assad regime. The use of chemical weapons on rebels and 
civilians throughout the civil war, even after Syria officially acceded to the CWC and 
declared its stockpiles destroyed, highlight the role that threats to security play in 
influencing a state’s decision to pursue a chemical weapons program and comply with the 
CWC.358 
 The Assad regime’s continued use of chemical weapons over the past seven years, 
in spite of international condemnation, suggests that domestic pressures on the Syrian 
president are supportive of, or at least unopposed, to the development and use of 																																																								
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chemical weapons.359 There is little publically available information on such pressures, 
however.  
 In the decades leading up to its joining of the CWC, Syria had a substantial 
history of domestic policies supporting the development, stockpiling, and use of chemical 
weapons.360 Its decision to accede to the convention, only done under international 
pressure following a United Nations investigation into the use of chemical weapons in 
2013, was in direct contrast to its domestic practices.361 It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
the Assad regime has continued to use chemical weapons against opposition forces and 
citizens in violation of the regulations outlined in the CWC. 
 Syria is not currently a member of any international organizations or party to any 
international agreements that could place external pressure on it to sign and comply with 
the CWC. Since the start of the Syrian civil war between the current government under 
Bashar al-Assad and opposition forces in 2011, the country has faced significant 
international pressure to join the CWC and give up its chemical weapons stockpiles.362 
Following reports of chemical attacks within Syria in 2012 and 2013, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France all released statements detailing that intelligence 
assessments determined there was a high likelihood chemical agents had been used and 
that the Syrian government forces were responsible for their use.363 On August 21, 2013, 
a chemical weapons attack attributed to Syrian government forces in the suburbs of 
Damascus resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 civilians. This incident greatly increased 																																																								
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the international pressure on Syria with the United States, Britain, and France all 
considering military action against the Syrian government in response.364 In the aftermath 
of the attack, Russia, an ally of al-Assad’s government, recognized the growing risk for 
international intervention in the civil war against the Syrian government forces. It 
proposed a plan for Syria to surrender its chemical weapons stockpiles to the 
international community and accede to the CWC if no military action would be taken 
against al-Assad’s government. This proposal was accepted by the United States and 
Syria joined the CWC on September 12, 2013.365 
 Although international pressure from the United States and other Western 
countries led to Syria’s accession to the CWC, it has not influenced the country’s 
compliance with the Convention’s restrictions on research, production, and use of 
chemical weapons. Since Syria committed to the CWC, approximately 50 chemical 
weapons attacks have been attributed to Syrian government forces.366 Russia, whose 
cooperation with the United States led to Syria’s signing of the CWC, has opposed any 
further investigation into the Assad regime. It has used its position on the UN Security 
Council to veto resolutions condemning chemical weapons attacks and to extend 
investigations to identify the parties responsible for the attacks.367 The result is that while 
pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France appears to have little 
impact on Syria’s commitment and compliance with the CWC, the Assad government is 
highly influenced by pressure from the Russian government. 
 The case of Syria is an illustration of 1, 2, 4, and 5. Since the start of its civil war, 
Syria’s economy has fallen significantly and it likely would not have the resources 																																																								
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necessary to start a chemical weapons program at this point in time. But with foreign 
assistance and the development of massive stockpiles of chemical munitions, Syria has 
managed to mitigate these hurdles and find other sources of supplies to support its 
program. This is consistent with the argument outlined in hypothesis 1. Since it first 
developed its chemical weapons program, Syria has faced both internal and external 
threats that it lacks the conventional military strength to counter. Therefore, its violation 
of the CWC is an example of hypothesis 2. Syria’s original pursuit of chemical warfare 
capabilities led to decades of domestic policies supporting the production and use of 
chemical weapons. Its accession to the CWC was in direct opposition to those internal 
practices and so, as predicted by hypothesis 4, its noncompliance with the convention can 
be seen as a continuation of those domestic policies. Syria’s accession to the CWC came 
after pressure from the Russian government and its continuing noncompliance comes 
with Russian obstruction of international oversight through the UN Security Council. 
These actions support the arguments in hypothesis 5 that a state will act according to 
pressure from important partners and allies. When Russia proposed that Syria surrender 
its chemical weapons and join the CWC, it did so. But now that Russia has provided 
diplomatic cover and support, which is a kind of pressure in itself, for the Assad regime’s 
use of chemical warfare, Syria has continued to violate its commitments to the CWC. 
Hypothesis 3 does not apply to Syria, as there does not appear to be any significant 
domestic pressures for or against its chemical weapons program.  
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SECTION V – CONCLUSIONS ON CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT AND 
NONPROLIFERATION 
 
 Analysis of the cases above indicates that domestic and external pressures are 
factors that have a strong influence on states that comply with the aspects of the CWC 
covering the research, development, and use of chemical weapons. Among countries that 
do not comply with the CWC, the availability of resources for a chemical weapons 
program, the presence of threats to security, and domestic norms are the most influential 
factors.  
 States that have no previous history of chemical weapons programs prior to 
signing the CWC have all remained in full compliance with the Convention since they 
joined it. In the case studies of Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Argentina, and Cameroon, the 
hypotheses that appeared to best explain the states decision to sign and comply with the 
CWC were hypothesis 3, 4, and 5. Hypotheses 1 and 2 had mixed results. Based on these 
results, it appears that the factors that most strongly influence non-chemical weapons 
capable states are domestic pressures, domestic norms, and external pressures.  
 The cases of Germany, the United States, and Libya were representative of 
chemical weapons capable countries that gave up their programs, signed the CWC, and 
have remained in compliance with the aspects regarding research, production, and use 
since then. The hypotheses that best describe the behavior of these countries are 
hypotheses 3 and 5. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 returned mixed results. This indicates that the 
factors that were most important to the decision to sign and comply with the CWC for 
countries with historical chemical weapons programs were domestic and external 
pressure.  
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 Russia and Syria were the cases for countries with chemical weapons programs 
prior to joining the CWC that have not complied with the Convention in regards to the 
use and production of chemical weapons. The analysis of these case studies suggests that 
the hypotheses that best represent the behavior of these states are hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. 
Hypothesis 5 produced mixed results and hypothesis 3 was inconclusive, as it did not 
apply to either case. The resulting conclusion is that the availability of resources for the 
chemical weapons program, the presence of threats to security, and domestic norms are 
the most important factors in a chemical weapons capable state’s decision to commit to 
but not comply with the CWC.  
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CHAPTER IV – COMPLIANCE THROUGH NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
SECTION I – INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE VII 
  
In addition to prohibiting the research, production, and use of chemical weapons, 
the CWC also looks to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons through the 
implementation of national legislation. Article VII of the Convention outlines the need 
for countries to incorporate legislation into their national frameworks that prohibits the 
development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons as outlined in the 
Convention.368 Specifically, signatory states must adopt measures that cover three areas: 
to prohibit and make it a crime for any person or entity to engage in activities prohibited 
under the CWC anywhere within the country or its jurisdiction, to not permit activity 
prohibited by the CWC to occur in any place under the country’s control, and to make it a 
crime for any citizens of the country to engage in activity prohibited by the CWC 
anywhere in the world.369 
These laws are expected to cover several areas that are referred to as “initial 
measures” including: defining the terms “chemical weapons,” “toxic chemical,” 
“precursor,” and “purposes not prohibited” in a manner that is consistent with the CWC; 
outlining the requirements for reporting on the transfers of schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals 
as defined in CWC (see Appendix 5); banning the activities prohibited in the CWC and 
setting penalties for violations of those bans by legal persons within the country; 
																																																								
368 “Article VII National Implementation Measures,” OPCW, 1993, https://www.opcw.org/chemical-
weapons-convention/articles/article-vii-national-implementation-measures. 
369 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 
	 97	
extending the penal code to allow for the prosecution of the country’s nationals 
regardless of the location where their violations occurred (extraterritoriality); and 
assigning legal powers to the relevant government agencies to regulate and enforce these 
prohibitions.370 Countries are also supposed to submit updates to the OPCW regarding 
their compliance with this article and to provide the organization with the text of the laws 
covering these areas. Using this information, the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the group 
responsible for carrying out the Convention’s verification measures and for providing 
technical assistance to countries that need it to fully implement the CWC, determines if a 
country is in compliance or not.371  
As of July 31, 2018, approximately 63% of the states parties have implemented 
national legislation covering all of the initial measures. An additional 17% have 
implemented legislation covering some, but not all, of the initial measures.372 This means 
that roughly one-fifth of the CWC’s signatories still lack any national measures for 
enforcing and prosecuting violations on their territory or by their citizens despite such 
legislation being required by the text of the CWC. Most of these countries are small states 
with no history of chemical weapons programs and at little risk of obtaining chemical 
weapons capabilities.373 A few of the countries, however, are states that have had 
programs in the past or are located in areas of the globe that have seen chemical weapons 
proliferation. These states include Libya and Syria.374  																																																								
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Among the countries that do have fully implemented national legislation (see 
Appendix 4 for a complete list) it is difficult to ascertain if the laws are being properly 
enforced. Violations are generally only discovered when the perpetrators are caught. As a 
result, there is persistent and inevitable uncertainty over how many violations are actually 
occurring and whether national legislation is being appropriately implemented and 
enforced. This chapter will primarily examine the implementation of national laws as 
evidence of compliance or noncompliance. A section regarding enforcement of the 
national legislation is included below in Section III. 
The hypothesis regarding compliance with Article VII of the Convention is that 
states that have no history of chemical weapons capabilities and with developing 
economies will have little political urgency and few resources to dedicate to 
implementing national legislation. Therefore, their lack of compliance is unintentional.  
 
 
SECTION II – NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Nearly all of the 71 countries that have not fully implemented the initial measures 
required under Article VII are developing countries that have historically neither had nor 
pursued chemical weapons capabilities.375 This suggests that noncompliance with the 
CWC due to a lack of national legislation is primarily unintentional rather than a 
deliberate effort to keep the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons legal.376 
While this may explain why the majority of the states have not fully implemented initial 																																																								
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measures, there are some states that do have a history of chemical weapons development 
and use.377 For these countries there should be the additional consideration of whether the 
lack of implementation is deliberate.  
I have selected the cases of Bolivia, Armenia, and Lebanon for analysis using the 
hypothesis. Bolivia, Armenia, and Lebanon were chosen as representative examples of 
the common setbacks facing the countries that have not fully implemented Article VII. 
They are all states that have never had a chemical weapons program, are uninterested in 
pursuing chemical warfare, and are middle-income economies.378 Additionally, they are 
countries that have had changes in their implementation status over the last seven years, 
which will allow the analysis to track how the variation of circumstances impacted 
national implementation.  
I will also look at the cases of Libya and Syria. Since these are the only states that 
declared chemical weapons upon joining the CWC to not have implemented national 
legislation, they are not indicative of any larger trend.379 I will therefore consider each 
case on its own without an attempt to draw any broader conclusions. 
 
BOLIVIA 
 
 On January 13, 1993, the CWC opened for signature and Bolivia signed it one day 
later.380 Bolivia ratified the Convention with the passage of Act No. 1870 on June 15, 
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1998.381 Prior to the CWC, Bolivia’s primary law relating to hazardous chemicals was 
Environmental Law No. 1333, which stipulates in Article 113 that any person or entity 
involved in the introduction, transport, or storage of toxic waste, including chemicals, 
within the country can face a prison term of up to ten years.382 This legislation, however, 
chiefly focuses on environmental restrictions rather than prohibiting the development, 
production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by individuals within the country. 
The ratification of the CWC meant that Bolivia was now required to comply with its 
contents, including Article VII. However, Environmental Law No. 1333 did not cover 
many of the initial measures required by Article VII, therefore requiring the 
implementation of new regulations. Over the next decade, Bolivia worked to create and 
pass a set of laws that would meet the requirements stipulated by Article VII.  
 Throughout the early and mid 2000s, Bolivia submitted draft legislation to the 
Technical Secretariat for feedback at least once a year.383 Despite these efforts, progress 
towards passing the regulations was slow and faced setbacks. For example, in April of 
2006, Bolivia reported to the OPCW that there “no material or technical resources were 
available to achieve its objectives” and that it “would continue to need external assistance 
to achieve its goals”.384 Later that year, it further expanded on this by saying that 
assistance with reviewing the draft regulations was necessary because its National 
Authority lacked the required funding and remained unstaffed. The draft legislation was 
submitted to the Bolivian National Congress in November 2007 but the process was 
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delayed further by the adoption of a new constitution in December of 2008.385 Because of 
the delay and changes to the structure of the National Authority due to the new 
constitution, the draft had to be resubmitted to Parliament. This was not accomplished 
until 2010.386 Then, it would be another three years before the “Ley de Armas de fugeo, 
municiones, explosivos y otras materiales relacionados” was adopted by the Bolivian 
National Congress on August 28, 2013.387 The passage of this legislation, which was 
assessed to cover all of the initial measures required by the CWC, placed the country in 
full compliance with Article VII.388  
Since that time, however, Bolivia has raised questions about the 
comprehensiveness of its regulations. During the August 2017 to July 2018 reporting 
period, Bolivia “informed the [Technical] Secretariat that it has legislation covering only 
some of the measure and has requested legislative assistance in addressing the gaps in its 
legislative and regulatory framework on the Convention.”389 In response to this, the 
OPCW has downgraded Bolivia to a partial implementation status and requested more 
information regarding the deficiencies in its legislation. As of May 2019, Bolivia has not 
yet publically disclosed what areas of legislation contain gaps. 390 
 The case of Bolivia highlights the difficulties faced by many countries when 
adopting national legislation to implement the CWC. The country ratified the CWC in 
1998, which means that it was in noncompliance with Article VII until at least 2013 and 
now may be in noncompliance once again. This violation is clearly not a conscious 
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choice, however, as Bolivia’s regular status updates and draft submissions to the 
Technical Secretariat indicate it is committed to developing and implementing effective 
national legislation. Instead, Bolivia’s noncompliance appears to stem from insufficient 
resources and hurdles in government and the legislative process. As its representatives 
repeatedly pointed out to the OPCW, the country lacked the means to establish a 
functioning National Authority that would oversee and organize the implementation 
process because the National Authority decree passed by the its congress lacked 
sufficient funding to procure the necessary technical and material resources.391 
Additionally, passing national regulations on chemical weapons was of low importance 
within the government, especially when considering the other matters on the table such as 
adopting a new constitution.392 This resulted in a slow legislative process. The draft 
regulations took roughly 15 years to work their way through the National Congress and 
be approved. The case of Bolivia also illustrates that even once implemented, national 
regulations may fall short of their intended goal. Its comment to the Technical Secretariat 
during the last reporting period indicates that although the regulations may appear to 
cover all the initial measures on paper, Bolivia has been unable to implement them in a 
way that fulfills its obligations under the CWC.  
 
 
ARMENIA 
 
 Armenia ratified the CWC on January 27, 1995, and the Convention entered into 
force in the country on April 29, 1997 when the required 65 instruments of ratification 																																																								
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were obtained.393 Per Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution, which was adopted on June 
5, 1995, international treaties become part of the Armenian legal system upon their 
ratification.394 Therefore, in addition to requiring compliance with the Convention, the 
CWC’s ratification also established it as superseding any domestic laws that may be in 
conflict with the prohibitions set out in the Convention. When Armenia constructed and 
adopted the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia in 2003, it included measures 
relating to WMDs in an effort to comply with the CWC and other non-proliferation 
treaties.395 Because this umbrella law covered nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, 
Armenia’s Ministry of Justice originally asserted that it did not need further legislation to 
meet the requirements of Article VII.396 
To confirm that its current legislation was sufficient, Armenia requested that the 
Technical Secretariat review it. After reviewing the existing legislation, however, the 
Technical Secretariat recommended Armenia make updates to its legal code that 
specifically target chemical weapons to allow for more effective implementation of the 
CWC. The changes, which Armenia adopted, were primarily aimed at ensuring the state’s 
ability to accurately report on schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals.397 With the updates, the 
Criminal Code was deemed to cover all the initial measures required by Article VII in 
2006.398 However, by 2010, this assessment had changed; the Technical Secretariat 
recommended including additional specific legislation to complement the more 																																																								
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394 Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations, “The report of the Republic of Armenia on the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004),” 2004, 2, 
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overarching existing laws.399After modifying Government Decree No. 861, the legislation 
regarding a protection plan in case of a chemical attack or other chemicals-related 
disaster, to include definitions of “chemical weapons,” “poisonous chemicals,” “toxic 
chemicals,” “precursors,” and “chemical equipment,” Armenia was once again declared 
in compliance with Article VII.400  
In 2015, the Technical Secretariat raised additional concerns about the 
comprehensiveness of the legislation covering chemical weapons and Armenia was 
determined to be lacking regulations regarding some of the initial measures.401 In 
particular, it assessed that Armenia’s penal code did not include extraterritoriality for 
Armenian nationals who engaged in prohibited activities outside of the country’s 
jurisdiction.402 This evaluation of partial implementation has continued through 2018 as 
Armenia continues to interface with the Technical Secretariat to address its gaps in 
national implementation.403  
 The case of Armenia illustrates another difficulty facing countries implementing 
national legislation: a lack of clarity on what the regulations require and how they should 
be incorporated into existing legal structures. In several instances, Armenia believed it 
was and declared to be in compliance only to have it be determined that its laws were not 
specific enough to allow for effective implementation of its obligations under the CWC. 
Although Armenia has not been in compliance with Article VII, its violations have not 																																																								
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been intentional. It has updated its Criminal Code when alerted of a potential area of 
noncompliance and continues to work with the Technical Secretariat to address its 
outstanding gaps in legislation.404 
 
LEBANON 
 
 Lebanon’s legal restrictions on the use of chemical weapons predate its accession 
to the CWC in 2008. A 1958 act outlines that “all acts intended to cause a state of terror 
or committed by means such as explosive devices, inflammable substances, poisonous or 
incendiary products or infectious or microbial agents that are of such nature as to cause a 
public danger” are punishable by a life sentence of hard labor or execution.405 It was 
passed as part of a broader effort to increase the criminal penalties for sedition, terrorism, 
and civil war.406 Although this law does not specifically address chemical weapons use, it 
could have been used to prosecute perpetrators who did engage in the use of such 
weapons. However, this preexisting legislation was not sufficient to cover the initial 
measures detailed in Article VII once Lebanon had joined the CWC in 2008.407 For 
example, it did not contain definitions for terms central to the CWC such as “chemical 
weapon”, it lacked a legal framework for reporting on the use of scheduled chemicals, it 
did not allow for extraterritoriality, and although it more broadly provided an avenue for 
the prosecution of chemical weapons use, it never actually established them as prohibited 
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substances.408 As a result, Lebanon and the Technical Secretariat determined that 
additional national legislation would be required to be in compliance with Article VII.409 
 To assist with the implementation process, Lebanon requested and received model 
provisions and samples of the national legislation of other States Parties from the 
Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat additionally offered assistance to the 
country in determining what measures to adopt and how existing legislation fit in to the 
obligations of the Convention.410 After several years of minimal progress, Lebanon 
participated in the Internship Programme for Legal Drafters and National Authorities’ 
Representatives in 2013. The program is a week long legal workshop designed to provide 
countries and their representatives with the skills to draft national legislation and see it 
through the approval process held by the OPCW to assist states that are not yet in 
compliance with Article VII of the CWC.411 As a result of the program, the 
representatives of Lebanon were able to produce a draft national implementing legislation 
and to submit it to the National Authority later the same year. In 2014, the National 
Authority noted a delay in the draft’s progress due to its translation into Arabic but 
reaffirmed that its adoption was of high priority.412 As of 2018, Lebanon is still 
determined to be in noncompliance with Article VII as it waits for government approval 
of its draft national implementation measures.413  
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 Lebanon’s case once again highlights that a lack of national implementation 
measures can primarily be due to insufficient resources and slow governmental processes 
rather than an intentional decision to remain in violation of Article VII. Lebanon has 
taken numerous steps to produce regulations covering the initial measures required by the 
CWC including seeking assistance from the Technical Secretariat and attending 
workshops to mitigate its lack of legal experience in this area. Although it remains in 
violation of the CWC, it is attempting to address the gaps in its national laws with the 
draft legislation that has been pending governmental approval for the past several years. 
A lack of urgency on the part of its government has greatly slowed Lebanon’s efforts to 
be in compliance with the CWC.  
 
 
As illustrated in the three cases above, most of the countries still lacking national 
implementation of the initial measures are doing so unintentionally, mostly due to a lack 
of resources, confusion about expectations, and slow approval of draft legislation by the 
countries’ governments. The vast majority of the 71 states that are not in compliance with 
Article VII of the CWC are actively working with the Technical Secretariat to address 
gaps in their legislation.  
 Although most of the countries without national legislation are non-chemical 
states, there are a few countries, primarily Libya and Syria, that are chemical states and 
have yet to implement national measures. Given their current or historical chemical 
weapons capabilities, there is the possibility that their lack of compliance is deliberate 
rather than unintentional.  
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 Libya joined the CWC and gave up its chemical weapons program in 2004.414 It is 
not assessed to be interested in restarting its program at this point in time.415 The country 
has faced internal instability and civil war for significant periods over the last decade.416 
These conflicts have likely hindered Libya’s ability to adopt national legislation as 
competing coalitions have each created governments making it unclear what body would 
approve such legislation.417 In spite of the domestic turmoil, Libya currently has draft 
legislation awaiting government approval.418 This suggests that the country’s compliance 
issues are primarily due to instability and civil war rather than an intentional desire to 
keep chemical weapons legal within its borders.  
 Syria acceded to the CWC in 2013.419 When it committed to the Convention, 
Syria gave up its stockpiles for destruction and said it was ending its chemical weapons 
program. The use of chemical weapons by Syrian government forces in the years since 
then, however, indicates that the country still has an active chemical weapons program.420 
As of July 2018, it has not yet started draft legislation.421 It is possible that this delay is 
due domestic instability from the Syrian civil war but, given Syria’s ongoing chemical 
weapons program, it cannot be ruled out that Syria’s noncompliance with Article VII is 
deliberate. The Syrian government would likely be reluctant to pass legislation 
criminalizing the production and use of chemical weapons if they intended to maintain an 
active chemical warfare program.  																																																								
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SECTION III – NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
 
Compliance does not end with the implementation of national regulations, 
however. These laws must be enforced if they are to accomplish their goal of prohibiting 
the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons around the world. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess whether countries with national legislation are 
enforcing it properly by identifying illegal activities and prosecuting violations. 
Violations can generally only be detected when they are discovered. Detection requires 
effective monitoring and reporting, which in turn requires resources. A lack of resources 
or a lack of political will can make it challenging to determine the true number of 
violations, both detected and undetected, and, therefore, it can be difficult to evaluate 
whether national laws are being employed in an appropriate manner. This process is 
further complicated by the dual-use nature of many chemicals and related equipment, 
which can then require the differentiation between legitimate trade and chemical weapons 
proliferation. The difficulty in assessing compliance with the CWC through enforcement 
of national laws is illustrated in the cases of QC Chen and Hans Raj Shiv. 
 
 
QC CHEN 
 
QC Chen is a Chinese national who has been sanctioned multiple times since 
1997 by the United States for allegedly providing supplies to other countries’ chemical 
weapons programs, most frequently Iran.422 In response to the sanctions, China has 
pushed back highlighting that it is in compliance with Article VII and therefore would 																																																								
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have not allowed QC Chen’s business transactions if they were violating any aspect of 
the CWC.423 It is possible the QC Chen did not break any Chinese laws with his business 
dealings; however, given evidence linking him to exports of dual-use chemical 
precursors, equipment, and technology to Iran along with the assessment of US 
intelligence that he is a chemical weapons proliferator operating a black market for 
chemical weapons-related materials out of China, this is unlikely.424  
QC Chen is just one of many Chinese entities or foreign entities operating in 
China that have been sanctioned by the United States and other countries for their 
involvement in providing supplies and expertise for chemical weapons programs.425 
China has had laws prohibiting the production, development, and transfer of chemicals 
controlled by the CWC since 1995. An additional law passed in 1997 made it illegal to 
acquire, possess, store, use, aid another engaging in the aforementioned activities, and 
finance the aforementioned activities.426 But this pattern of alleged chemical weapons 
procurement raises questions about China’s enforcement of its national regulations 
regarding chemical weapons, especially in the areas of trade and dual-use materials. It is 
unclear whether the failure to catch these violations is due to a lack of resources to 
implement its national laws effectively or a willful blindness to the actions of these 
entities. Additionally, although the number of sanctioned entities is compelling evidence 
that China is at least not fully complying with the application of the laws stipulated under 
Article VII of the CWC, China maintains that these individuals and businesses did not 
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violate the law and are being wrongly punished as no evidence, which the US 
government asserts is based on intelligence sources, has been made public.427  
The dual-use nature to the materials being transferred makes it difficult to assess 
the validity of the United States’ and China’s assertions. Although dual-use chemicals 
and related technology can be used in weapons applications, they also have legitimate 
civilian and commercial uses.428 It can be difficult to determine if individuals or 
corporations that are involved in supplying chemical weapons programs with materials 
are aware of the purpose of the goods. Even evidence tying the entities to the final 
destinations of the goods is not entirely conclusive as commodities can be illicitly 
diverted from their original destination without the knowledge of the seller.429 This adds 
an additional layer of complexity to the challenge of assessing the enforcement of 
national legislation because entities can believe they are following the law while 
simultaneously being part of an unlawful procurement network. The case of QC Chen 
highlights the difficulties in determining if a country is implementing its national 
legislations and, if it is not, identifying if the noncompliance is intentional or 
unintentional.  
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HANS RAJ SHIV 
 
The case of Hans Raj Shiv also illustrates the difficulty in identifying if 
noncompliance is intentional or deliberate and in determining if discovered violations are 
isolated incidents or emblematic of a systemic problem. Shiv, an Indian national, is the 
founder of the India-based NEC Engineers Private Limited. In the early 2000s, NEC 
Engineers Private Ltd. was investigated for falsifying customs documents, mislabeling 
goods, and routing exports through other Middle Eastern countries to avoid UN 
restrictions on Iraqi imports in order to supply Iraq with materials for producing chemical 
weapons.430 The company was also accused of sending personnel to Iraq in order to 
install equipment for the Fallujah II chemical plant that was used for the large-scale 
manufacture of chlorine, which is a dual-use chemical with applications in water 
purification and as a chemical weapon.431 India’s decisions to suspend the export 
privileges of the company, revoke the passports of the company’s senior officials, and 
launch an investigation in response to the intelligence reports exposing evidence of 
possible violations, suggest that the lapses were unintentional.432 However, it is difficult 
to be certain that those actions were taken in an effort to enforce national non-
proliferation legislation and hold perpetrators responsible or if they were just in response 
to international pressure over the incident.433 This example also highlights the difficulties 
in determining if identified violations are isolated incidents or part of a larger trend. Since 
Hans Raj Shiv and his company were found to be exporting goods and materials to Iraq 																																																								
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in violation of Indian law and UN restrictions, there have been few allegations of CWC 
violations by entities in India or of Indian origin.434 What remains unclear is whether this 
is because there are no individuals or entities attempting to violate the prohibitions 
outlined in the CWC or whether it is because individuals and entities violating those 
prohibitions have remained undetected. 
 
 
Although national enforcement of restrictions on the production, stockpiling, 
trade, and use of chemical weapons is obviously essential to assessing compliance with 
the CWC, the examples above highlight the difficulties in determining the status of 
national enforcement. Given the uncertainty in considering if enforcement is occurring 
among countries that have implemented national legislation, another option would be to 
look at how violations by non-state actors have changed over time. Prior to the CWC’s 
entry into force in 1997, there were a large number of individuals and companies 
identified and prosecuted as chemical weapons proliferators. These were global illicit 
trade operations often incorporating people and entities in multiple countries including 
the United States, China, India, West Germany, Singapore, and Pakistan.435 Since the 
CWC has entered into force, the number of incidents involving violations of the 
Convention by companies and individuals has appeared to decrease.436  
In 1994, the US sanctioned 12 entities under the CBW Act for having been 
determined to have “knowingly contributed to the efforts of a country to acquire, use, or 
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stockpile chemical or biological weapons.”437 Six entities were sanctioned in 1995 and 10 
were sanctioned in 1997, the year the CWC entered into force. In 2002, five years after 
the CWC entered in to force, eight entities were sanctioned under the CBW Act.438 The 
following year, three entities were sanctioned. Since then, only foreign governments have 
been sanctioned under that act: Syria in 2013, North Korea in 2018, and Russia in 
2018.439 Although the U.S. Department of State’s List of Sanctioned Entities is a limited 
sample of data, the trend suggests that several years after the CWC entered into force, 
there were fewer incidents of individuals or companies being sanctioned for their support 
of chemical and biological weapons programs than there were in the years prior to 1997. 
This change could be because of a number of factors, such as the legal restrictions 
required by Article VII, a decrease in interest in pursuing chemical weapons capabilities, 
an increased ability of violators to escape detection, or a combination of the 
aforementioned.  
 
 
 
 
SECTION IV – CONCLUSIONS ON COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE VII 
 
 
 The countries that have struggled to be in compliance with Article VII of the 
CWC suggest that their noncompliance is primarily unintentional rather than purposeful. 
They are mainly developing countries and have not had a chemical weapons program in 
the past or expressed any interest in obtaining in the future. Therefore, there would be 
little motivation for them to resist criminalizing the development, storage, and use of 																																																								
437 Ibid.; 102th Congress, H.R.3409 – Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
Act of 1991, Library of Congress, November 26, 1991, https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-
congress/house-bill/3409. 
438 U.S. Department of State, “Complete List of Sanctioned Entities.” 
439 Ibid. 
	 115	
chemical weapons. It is more likely that their noncompliance is due to a lack of resources 
to properly implement the initial measures outlined in Article VII. The examination of the 
case studies Bolivia, Armenia, and Lebanon supports this supposition. These examples 
additionally demonstrate that confusion regarding how the measures should be 
incorporated into existing legal structures and slow governmental approval processes are 
also major contributors to a lack of national implementation measures. 
 In terms of determining compliance with Article VII in countries that have 
implemented legislation covering all of the initial measures, the limitations regarding 
assessing this area make it difficult to draw a broad conclusion. It appears that the 
number of violations of the CWC by individuals and entities has decreased since the 
Convention has entered into force. This would suggest that at least some states are in 
compliance as either the countries’ adoption of new national legislation or their 
enforcement of such regulations is proving to be a deterrent to would-be violators. But 
given the uncertainty in identifying violations, this conclusion cannot be given much 
weight. 
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Main Findings 
 
 This thesis examined the factors that influenced compliance or noncompliance 
with the CWC from the vantage points of chemical disarmament and nonproliferation and 
national legislation. Both sections utilized case studies of various countries to assess what 
circumstances were influential in a state’s decision to comply or not comply with the 
CWC. The analysis of the case studies on chemical disarmament and nonproliferation 
found that domestic and external pressure were the most significant factors among states 
that were in compliance with the CWC. In countries that were in compliance with the 
CWC and also had no history of chemical weapons programs, the presence of domestic 
norms against chemical weapons was an additional influencing factor. Among countries 
that were not in compliance with the CWC, the most important factors in the decision to 
not comply with the Convention were access to resources for a chemical weapons 
program, the presence of security threats, and domestic norms in favor of chemical 
weapons programs.  
 The analysis of case studies on the implementation of national legislation 
determined that a lack of resources and low political priority for adopting measures 
required by the CWC were the primary reasons countries had not yet implemented the 
legislation required by Article VII. For countries that have implemented national 
legislation, it is difficult to draw a broad conclusion because of the complicated task of 
assessing the effectiveness of enforcement as both of the case studies in this section 
highlighted. An examination of how United States sanctions on individuals and entities 
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for chemical weapons-related violations have changed since the CWC entered into force 
suggests that the number of violations has decreased in the years since 1997. It is not 
clear if this is due to the implementation of national legislation, a decrease in interest in 
procuring materials for chemical weapons, or the increased ability of entities to evade 
detection.  
 
Implications and Recommendations 
 
 The conclusions of this thesis hold implications for the future of the CWC and 
chemical disarmament and nonproliferation efforts more broadly. They illustrate that in 
terms of disarmament and nonproliferation, countries that comply with the CWC are 
primarily influenced by domestic and external pressure to sign the Convention and abide 
by its restrictions. Countries that do not comply with the CWC, however, are faced with 
significant threats to their security and have both access to resources for a program and 
domestic norms in support of it. Therefore, if the international community is looking to 
strengthen compliance with the disarmament and nonproliferation aspects of the CWC, it 
should focus on combining these factors to influence states’ behavior. Encouraging 
domestic and external pressure on a noncompliant country from entities the country cares 
about in addition to restricting the country’s access to resources it needs to support its 
program and providing outreach to help mitigate security threats could provide an 
environment that is conducive to motivating a country to come into compliance with the 
CWC. This approach could also be used to target Israel, Egypt, South Sudan, and North 
Korea, which have yet to accede to the CWC.  
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 In terms of national legislation, the conclusions demonstrate that states that are 
not in compliance with the CWC are generally noncompliant out of a lack of resources 
and lack of political urgency to adopt such measures. To boost compliance among these 
countries, the Technical Secretariat could provide additional legislation review services, 
drafting workshops, and give presentations to the country’s lawmakers to emphasize the 
importance of Article VII to help countries draft and adopt legislation in a timely manner. 
Clearer and more detailed explanations of what national legislations should include 
would also likely result in a more streamlined implementation process, as it would 
prevent states from adopting laws they believe cover all initial measures required by the 
CWC only to discover later on that they do not.  
 The conclusions on national legislation also highlight that as more and more states 
adopt laws to enforce the CWC within their territory, the next challenge in assessing 
compliance will be tracking enforcement of national legislation. This is an issue that the 
OPCW should begin addressing now to prevent difficulties with unintentional 
noncompliance due to a lack of resources, lack of will, or confusion about the 
requirements down the road. By providing additional resources and training for countries 
upfront to assist in the establishment of enforcement mechanisms and tracking, the 
international community can likely avoid some of the noncompliance issues seen with the 
implementation of national legislation.  
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Conclusion 
 
 In the past year, dozens of people have died and hundreds have been injured in 
chemical weapons attacks.440 While these numbers may pale in comparison to the number 
of people injured and killed by conventional arms, the use of chemical warfare is still a 
very pressing issue. Civilian populations are uniquely vulnerable to chemical weapons 
attacks because they lack protective equipment. Nearly all of the causalities from 
chemical attacks in the last year have been civilians.441 Additionally, children and babies 
are often disproportionately affected by exposure to chemical agents because their small 
bodies have much lower lethal doses than adults. The risk that these weapons pose to 
vulnerable populations in addition to the suffering that they inflict upon victims 
highlights the importance of reducing their use. 
While this thesis has primarily focused on issues of compliance and 
noncompliance with the CWC, there are broader implications for the conclusions than 
just improving compliance with the Convention. Increased compliance with the CWC 
moves the international community closer to the complete elimination of chemical 
warfare and, in turn, decreases the chance than anyone, civilians and soldiers alike, will 
become the victim of a chemical weapons attack. This thesis hopes to contribute to that 
process by identifying the factors that are most important in a country’s decision to 
comply or not comply with the CWC so that they can be leveraged to promote 
disarmament, nonproliferation, and the implementation of effective criminal penalties.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
 
 
Blistering Agent: compound that produce burn-like skin injuries  
 
Blood Agent: compound that disrupts the ability of blood cells to transfer oxygen 
 
Choking Agent: compound that causes swelling and fluid secretion in the respiratory 
track 
 
Lachrymator: chemical agent that causes tear production 
 
Nerve Agent: organophosphorous compound that blocks nerve impulses between cells 
 
Precursor: a chemical that is used as a reactant in the synthesis of chemical weapons  
 
Riot Control Agent: compound that causes temporary irritation to the eyes, skin, and 
respiratory system, effects disappear quickly after exposure is ended 
 
Sternutator: chemical agent that causes respiratory irritation resulting in sneezing 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Country Responses to Declaration (IV, 2) of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference as of July 
29, 1899442 
Country Declaration (IV, 2) 
Germany Signed 
Austria-Hungary Signed 
Belgium Signed 
China Signed 
Denmark Signed 
Spain Signed 
United States of America Not Signed 
United Mexican States Signed 
France Signed 
Great Britain Not Signed 
Greece Signed 
Italy Signed 
Japan Signed 
Luxemburg Signed 
Montenegro Signed 
Netherlands Signed 
Persia Signed 
Portugal Signed 
Roumania Signed 
Russia Signed 
Serbia Signed 
Siam Signed 
United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway Signed 
Switzerland Signed 
Turkey Signed 
Bulgaria Signed 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Country Responses to the Questions Posed to the Committee with Respect to Poison 
Gases on December 6, 1921443 
 Japan France Italy Great Britain United States 
“Do poisonous gases represent 
as to their effect a weapon 
analogous to the other means of 
fighting?” 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
“Is it possible to take as a basis 
for a conventional limitation of 
the uses of poisonous gases their 
physical, chemical or 
physicological effects?” 
No No No No No 
“Is it technically possible or not 
to confine the actions of 
poisonous gases to combatants 
only?” 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
“Is it technically possible or not 
to prevent the research or 
fabrication of poisonous gases in 
time of peace?” 
Yes No No No No 
“Is it technically possible or not 
to restrict the research of 
poisonous gases in time of 
peace?” 
No No No No No 
“Is it technically possible or not 
to restrict the fabrication of 
poisonous gases in time of 
peace?” 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
“Assuming that it would be 
possible to restrict the research 
or fabrication of poisonous gases 
in time of peace, is it technically 
possible or not to supervise such 
research or fabrication?” 
Yes 
Yes for 
fabrication, 
No for 
research 
Yes for 
fabrication, 
No for 
research 
No No 
“Is it possible to establish a 
conventional basis for the 
limitation of the use of gases, on 
the ground of the effect of the 
gases; e.g., prohibiting the use of 
lethal gases against cities?” 
No No No No No 
																																																								
443 Minutes (Uncorrected) of Committee Meetings at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 342-
346. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties444 
Country Signature Ratification/Accession 
Afghanistan 1/14/93 9/24/03 
Albania 1/14/93 5/11/94 
Algeria 1/13/93 8/14/95 
Andorra — 2/27/03 
Angola — 9/16/15 
Antigua & Barbuda — 8/29/05 
Argentina 1/13/93 10/2/95 
Armenia 3/19/93 1/27/95 
Australia 1/13/93 5/6/94 
Austria 1/13/93 8/17/95 
Azerbaijan 1/13/93 2/29/00 
Bahamas 3/2/94 4/21/09 
Bahrain 2/24/93 4/28/97 
Bangladesh 1/14/93 4/25/97 
Barbados — 3/7/07 
Belarus 1/14/93 7/11/96 
Belgium 1/13/93 1/27/97 
Belize — 12/1/03 
Benin 1/14/93 5/14/98 
Bhutan 4/23/97 8/18/05 
Bolivia 1/14/93 8/14/98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1/16/97 2/25/97 
Botswana — 8/31/98 
Brazil 1/13/93 3/13/96 
Brunei Darussalem 1/13/93 7/28/97 																																																								
444 Kimball, “Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties.”  
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Bulgaria 1/13/93 8/10/94 
Burkina Faso 1/14/93 7/8/97 
Burundi 1/15/93 9/4/98 
Cambodia 1/15/93 7/19/05 
Cameroon 1/14/93 9/16/96 
Canada 1/13/93 9/26/95 
Cape Verde 1/15/93 10/10/03 
Central African Republic 1/14/93 9/20/06 
Chad 10/11/94 2/13/04 
Chile 1/14/93 7/12/96 
China 1/13/93 4/25/97 
Colombia 1/13/93 4/5/00 
Comoros 1/13/93 9/17/06 
Congo 1/15/93 12/4/07 
Cook Islands 1/14/93 7/15/94 
Costa Rica 1/14/93 5/31/96 
Côte d'Ivoire 1/13/93 12/18/95 
Croatia 1/13/93 5/23/95 
Cuba 1/13/93 4/29/97 
Cyprus 1/13/93 8/28/98 
Czech Republic 1/14/93 3/6/96 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1/14/93 10/12/05 
Denmark 1/14/93 7/13/95 
Djibouti 9/28/93 1/25/06 
Dominica 8/2/93 2/12/01 
Dominican Republic 1/13/93 3/26/09 
Ecuador 1/14/93 9/6/95 
El Salvador 1/14/93 10/30/95 
Egypt     
Equatorial Guinea 1/14/93 4/25/97 
Eritrea — 2/14/00 
Estonia 1/14/93 5/26/99 
Ethiopia 1/14/93 5/13/96 
Fiji 1/14/93 1/20/93 
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Finland 1/14/93 2/7/95 
France 1/13/93 3/2/95 
Gabon 1/13/93 9/8/00 
Gambia 1/13/93 5/19/98 
Georgia 1/14/93 11/27/95 
Germany 1/13/93 8/12/94 
Ghana 1/14/93 7/9/97 
Greece 1/13/93 12/22/94 
Grenada 4/9/97 6/3/05 
Guatemala 1/14/93 2/12/03 
Guinea 1/14/93 6/9/97 
Guinea-Bissau 1/14/93 6/19/08 
Guyana 10/6/93 9/12/97 
Haiti 1/14/93 2/22/06 
Holy See 1/14/93 5/12/99 
Honduras 1/13/93 8/29/05 
Hungary 1/13/93 10/31/96 
Iceland 1/13/93 4/28/97 
India 1/14/93 9/3/96 
Indonesia 1/13/93 11/12/98 
Iran 1/13/93 11/3/97 
Iraq — 1/13/09 
Ireland 1/14/93 6/24/96 
Israel 1/13/93 — 
Italy 1/13/93 12/8/95 
Jamaica 4/18/97 9/8/00 
Japan 1/13/93 9/15/95 
Jordan — 10/29/97 
Kazakhstan 1/14/93 3/23/00 
Kenya 1/15/93 4/25/97 
Kiribati — 9/7/00 
Kuwait 1/27/93 5/28/97 
Kyrgyzstan 2/22/93 9/29/03 
Laos 5/13/93 2/25/97 
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Latvia 5/6/93 7/23/96 
Lebanon — 11/20/08 
Lesotho 12/7/94 12/7/94 
Liberia 1/15/93 3/25/06 
Libya — 1/6/04 
Liechtenstein 7/21/93 11/24/99 
Lithuania 1/13/93 4/15/98 
Luxembourg 1/13/93 4/15/97 
Macedonia — 6/20/97 
Madagascar 1/15/93 10/20/04 
Malawi 1/14/93 6/11/98 
Malaysia 1/13/93 4/20/00 
Maldives 10/1/93 5/31/94 
Mali 1/13/93 4/28/97 
Malta 1/13/93 4/28/97 
Marshall Islands 1/13/93 5/19/04 
Mauritania 1/13/93 2/9/98 
Mauritius 1/14/93 2/9/93 
Mexico 1/13/93 8/29/94 
Micronesia 1/13/93 6/21/99 
Moldova 1/13/93 7/8/96 
Monaco 1/13/93 6/1/95 
Mongolia 1/14/93 1/17/95 
Montenegro — 10/23/06 
Morocco 1/13/93 12/28/95 
Mozambique — 8/15/00 
Myanmar 1/14/93 08/07/15 
Namibia 1/13/93 11/27/95 
Nauru 1/13/93 11/12/01 
Nepal 1/19/93 11/18/97 
Netherlands 1/14/93 6/30/95 
New Zealand 1/14/93 7/15/96 
Nicaragua 3/9/93 11/5/99 
Niger 1/14/93 4/9/97 
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Nigeria 1/13/93 5/20/99 
Niue — 4/21/05 
North Korea     
Norway 1/13/93 4/7/94 
Oman 2/2/93 2/8/95 
Pakistan 1/13/93 10/28/97 
Palau — 2/3/03 
Palestine — 5/17/18 
Panama 6/16/93 10/7/98 
Papua New Guinea 1/14/93 4/17/96 
Paraguay 1/14/93 12/1/94 
Peru 1/14/93 7/20/95 
Philippines 1/13/93 12/11/96 
Poland 1/13/93 8/23/95 
Portugal 1/13/93 9/10/96 
Qatar 2/1/93 9/3/97 
Romania 1/13/93 2/15/95 
Russia 1/13/93 11/5/97 
Rwanda 5/17/93 3/31/04 
St. Kitts & Nevis 3/16/94 5/21/04 
St. Lucia 3/29/93 4/9/97 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 9/20/93 9/18/02 
Samoa 1/14/93 9/27/02 
San Marino 1/13/93 12/10/99 
Sao Tome and Principe — 9/9/03 
Saudi Arabia 1/20/93 8/9/96 
Senegal 1/13/93 7/20/98 
Serbia — 4/20/00 
Seychelles 1/15/93 4/7/93 
Sierra Leone 1/15/93 9/30/04 
Singapore 1/14/93 5/21/97 
Slovak Republic 1/14/93 10/27/95 
Slovenia 1/14/93 6/11/97 
Solomon Islands — 9/23/04 
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Somalia — 5/29/13 
South Africa 1/14/93 9/13/95 
South Korea 1/14/93 4/28/97 
South Sudan     
Spain 1/13/93 8/3/94 
Sri Lanka 1/14/93 8/19/94 
Sudan — 5/24/99 
Suriname 4/28/97 4/28/97 
Swaziland 9/23/93 11/20/96 
Sweden 1/13/93 6/17/93 
Switzerland 1/14/93 3/10/95 
Syria   9/12/13 
Tajikistan 1/14/93 1/11/95 
Tanzania 2/25/94 6/25/98 
Thailand 1/14/93 12/10/02 
Timor Leste — 5/7/03 
Togo 1/13/93 4/23/97 
Tonga — 5/29/03 
Trinidad & Tobago — 6/24/97 
Tunisia 1/13/93 4/15/97 
Turkey 1/14/93 5/12/97 
Turkmenistan 10/12/93 9/29/94 
Tuvalu — 1/19/04 
Uganda 1/14/93 11/30/01 
Ukraine 1/13/93 10/16/98 
United Arab Emirates 2/2/93 11/28/00 
United Kingdom 1/13/93 5/13/96 
United States 1/13/93 4/25/97 
Uruguay 1/15/93 10/6/94 
Uzbekistan 11/24/95 7/23/96 
Vanuatu — 9/16/05 
Venezuela 1/14/93 12/3/97 
Vietnam 1/13/93 9/30/98 
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Yemen 2/8/93 10/2/00 
Zambia 1/13/93 2/9/01 
Zimbabwe 1/13/93 4/25/97 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Implementation Status of National Legislation Measures as of July 31, 2018445 
Country Complete Partial None 
Afghanistan   X 
Albania X   
Algeria X   
Andorra X   
Angola  X  
Antigua & Barbuda  X  
Argentina X   
Armenia  X  
Australia X   
Austria X   
Azerbaijan X   
Bahamas   X 
Bahrain  X  
Bangladesh X   
Barbados   X 
Belarus X   
Belgium X   
Belize X   
Benin   X 
Bhutan  X  
Bolivia X   
Bosnia and Herzegovina X   
Botswana X   
Brazil X   
Brunei Darussalem   X 																																																								
445 OPCW, “Overview of the Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
as at 31 July 2018.” 
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Bulgaria X   
Burkina Faso X   
Burundi X   
Cambodia X   
Cameroon X   
Canada X   
Cape Verde X   
Central African Republic X   
Chad   X 
Chile  X  
China X   
Colombia X   
Comoros X   
Congo X   
Cook Islands X   
Costa Rica X   
Côte d'Ivoire  X  
Croatia X   
Cuba X   
Cyprus X   
Czech Republic X   
Democratic Republic of Congo   X 
Denmark X   
Djibouti   X 
Dominica  X  
Dominican Republic  X  
Ecuador  X  
El Salvador  X  
Egypt    
Equatorial Guinea   X 
Eritrea   X 
Estonia X   
Ethiopia X   
Fiji X   
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Finland X   
France X   
Gabon  X  
Gambia X   
Georgia  X  
Germany X   
Ghana  X  
Greece X   
Grenada X   
Guatemala  X  
Guinea   X 
Guinea-Bissau   X 
Guyana  X  
Haiti   X 
Holy See X   
Honduras  X  
Hungary X   
Iceland  X  
India X   
Indonesia X   
Iran X   
Iraq  X  
Ireland X   
Israel    
Italy X   
Jamaica   X 
Japan X   
Jordan X   
Kazakhstan X   
Kenya   X 
Kiribati X   
Kuwait  X  
Kyrgyzstan X   
Laos X   
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Latvia X   
Lebanon   X 
Lesotho X   
Liberia X   
Libya   X 
Liechtenstein X   
Lithuania X   
Luxembourg X   
Macedonia X   
Madagascar X   
Malawi   X 
Malaysia X   
Maldives   X 
Mali X   
Malta X   
Marshall Islands   X 
Mauritania X   
Mauritius X   
Mexico X   
Micronesia X   
Moldova X   
Monaco X   
Mongolia  X  
Montenegro X   
Morocco X   
Mozambique   X 
Myanmar  X  
Namibia   X 
Nauru   X 
Nepal   X 
Netherlands X   
New Zealand X   
Nicaragua  X  
Niger X   
	 134	
Nigeria  X  
Niue X   
North Korea    
Norway X   
Oman X   
Pakistan X   
Palau X   
Palestine   X 
Panama X   
Papua New Guinea   X 
Paraguay X   
Peru X   
Philippines  X  
Poland X   
Portugal X   
Qatar X   
Romania X   
Russia X   
Rwanda  X  
St. Kitts & Nevis X   
St. Lucia X   
St. Vincent & the Grenadines X   
Samoa  X  
San Marino  X  
Sao Tome and Principe   X 
Saudi Arabia X   
Senegal X   
Serbia X   
Seychelles  X  
Sierra Leone   X 
Singapore X   
Slovak Republic X   
Slovenia X   
Solomon Islands   X 
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Somalia   X 
South Africa X   
South Korea X   
South Sudan    
Spain X   
Sri Lanka X   
Sudan X   
Suriname   X 
Swaziland   X 
Sweden X   
Switzerland X   
Syria   X 
Tajikistan X   
Tanzania   X 
Thailand X   
Timor Leste  X  
Togo  X  
Tonga   X 
Trinidad & Tobago   X 
Tunisia X   
Turkey X   
Turkmenistan X   
Tuvalu   X 
Uganda X   
Ukraine X   
United Arab Emirates X   
United Kingdom X   
United States X   
Uruguay X   
Uzbekistan X   
Vanuatu   X 
Venezuela  X  
Vietnam X   
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Yemen X   
Zambia X   
Zimbabwe  X  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
A. GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS446  
Guidelines for Schedule 1  
1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic 
chemical or precursor should be included in Schedule 1:  
(a) It has been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon as defined 
in Article II;  
(b) It poses otherwise a high risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue 
of its high potential for use in activities prohibited under this Convention because one or 
more of the following conditions are met:  
. (i)  It possesses a chemical structure closely related to that of other toxic chemicals 
listed in Schedule 1, and has, or can be expected to have, comparable properties;   
. (ii)  It possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that 
would enable it to be used as a chemical weapon;   
. (iii)  It may be used as a precursor in the final single technological stage of production 
of a toxic chemical listed in Schedule 1, regardless of whether this stage takes 
place in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere;   
(d) It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.  
 
Guidelines for Schedule 2  
2. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic 
chemical not listed in Schedule 1 or a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical or to a chemical 
listed in Schedule 2, part A, should be included in Schedule 2:  
. (a)  It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention because it 																																																								
446 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. September 3, 1992. 	
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possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that 
could enable it to be used as a chemical weapon;   
. (b)  It may be used as a precursor in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of 
formation of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A;   
. (c)  It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of 
its importance in the production of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, 
part A;   
. (d)  It is not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under 
this Convention.   
 
Guidelines for Schedule 3  
3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic 
chemical or precursor, not listed in other Schedules, should be included in Schedule 3:  
. (a)  It has been produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon;   
. (b)  It poses otherwise a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention because it 
possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that 
might enable it to be used as a chemical weapon;   
. (c)  It poses a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its 
importance in the production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 1 or 
Schedule 2, part B;   
. (d)  It may be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited 
under this Convention.   
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